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International intellectual property (IP) law has shifted focus after the WTO Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) set out comprehensive global 
standards about 20 years ago: since the mid-nineties, most international rule-making to protect 
and enforce IP rights comes in form of bilateral or regional agreements, here generally referred 
to as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). As multilateral solutions have been increasingly difficult 
to agree upon, the world has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of these FTAs.  The wide 
range of issues covered by FTAs allow countries which are otherwise reluctant to agree to 
increases in IP protection to accept them because of trade-offs – such as obtaining (or avoid 
losing) preferential access to the markets of their FTA partners.  Because of these trade-offs, 
most FTAs with IP provisions contain obligations on the protection and enforcement of IP that 
set significantly higher standards than those of the TRIPS Agreement, commonly referred to as 
‘TRIPS-plus’ standards. 
 
Most commentators lament this development since TRIPS-plus IP obligations frequently 
undermine the ability of WTO Members to rely on the policy space and flexibilities TRIPS 
leaves to design national IP laws in light of domestic needs. UN human rights organs have 
considered such flexibilities critical for access to medicines and other essential goods. In this 
article, I will make a case for the continued relevance of the TRIPS Agreement as an 
overarching, multilateral framework for TRIPS-plus FTAs. My argument is based on the 
utilitarian objectives of IP protection that WTO Members have agreed to in Article 7 TRIPS. 
For the purpose of treaty law, these objectives form, together with the public interest principles 
expressed in Article 8 TRIPS, the agreement’s object and purpose. In the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, all WTO Members highlighted the principal role of 
these norms for interpreting and implementing TRIPS in a way that allows to give effect to 
public interests, such as access to medicines. 
 
The role of Articles 7 and 8 however goes beyond treaty interpretation and implementation: I 
argue that these norms are of integral character – such that provisions essential for giving effect 
to TRIPS’ object and purpose cannot, as a matter of treaty law, be derogated from in bilateral 
or regional agreements amongst WTO Members. The article intends to show this with reference 
to the negotiation history of Articles 7 and 8, the utilitarian objectives and public interest 
principles for IP protection they set out, and the recognition a common object and purpose 
warrants under general international law principles on inter-se modifications of multilateral 
treaties. For TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs, this means that they need to respect TRIPS 
provisions which are essential to give effect to the objectives and principles expressed in 
Articles 7 and 8. However, because these objectives and principles leave significant freedom to 
WTO Members in deciding on how to protect public interests and on the most appropriate 
balance between IP protection and access, they at best serve as a loose constitutional frame for 
TRIPS-plus protections in bilateral and regional agreements. Usually, they will allow FTA 
partners to re-balance TRIPS-plus protections with suitable exceptions or other limitations to 
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The international protection of intellectual property (IP) has developed significantly since the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations brought about the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
its Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1 That 
development is astonishing, since the TRIPS Agreement in itself marked a milestone in global 
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1C of the WTO Agreement (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299). 
IP norm-setting, and still constitutes the single most important treaty in the multilateral IP 
framework. TRIPS establishes a comprehensive set of obligations to essentially protect all types 
of IP rights, updates levels of protection to fit technological advances until the early nineties, 
and introduces for the first time a full range of rules on the enforcement of IP rights in domestic 
legal systems. Last but certainly not least, as part of WTO law, TRIPS subjects IP-related 
obligations (including to comply with the two main preceding international IP treaties)2 to WTO 
dispute settlement. For these reasons alone, TRIPS serves as the core reference point in 
analysing current international IP law and policy. 
 
While these reasons are well understood, TRIPS should further be recognised for serving as the 
first global expression of an agreed nature, function, and purpose of IP rights. In its Preamble, 
all WTO Members emphasise ‘that intellectual property rights are private rights’ – but in the 
following paragraph acknowledge ‘the underlying public policy objectives of national systems 
for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological 
objectives’. These two directly connected considerations of the Preamble indicate how the 
international IP system is designed to operate: in accordance with the standards set out in 
TRIPS, WTO members are obliged to grant and protect private rights for owners of IP from all 
other WTO members. These private rights provide their owners with exclusive control to 
prevent others (such as users or competitors) from exploiting the protected subject matter (such 
as works, inventions, or marks as indicators of commercial origin). This arguably unparalleled 
global system of protection for private rights however is not an end in itself, nor is it based on 
a commonly accepted natural rights logic, or on agreed ideas of a sacrosanct nature of property. 
In TRIPS, WTO Members also agree to limit IP rights in terms of subject matter, scope, by 
means of specific exceptions, state-granted allowance for use (compulsory licences), and in 
their duration. On the domestic level, granting and protecting IP by means of private rights 
usually serves public policy objectives – such as promoting creativity and innovation, access to 
essential goods and services, as well as the transfer of technology. WTO Members acknowledge 
these public policy objective in the TRIPS Preamble – which hence serves as a first indicator 
that TRIPS conceptualises IP protection as inherently utilitarian. In most countries that 
implement TRIPS, it is meant to fulfil a social function and should promote broader welfare 
objectives. 
 
This utilitarian approach is not only reflected in the language of the TRIPS preamble, and 
represents the overall most commonly accepted objective of IP protection in state practice and 
academic scholarship.3 Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis, it finds expression 
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For a comprehensive discussion on various justifications (and in favour of an instrumentalist, utilitarian approach), 
in the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed further in section 3, with 
Article 7 TRIPS, entitled ‘Objectives’, all WTO Members agree that IP protection and 
enforcement should contribute to various societal goals, and overall promote ‘social and 
economic welfare’. Section 3 also shows how the somewhat convoluted accumulation of more 
immediate aims and long-term goals expressed in Article 7 can be operationalised within the 
international IP system: together with the public interest ‘Principles’ embodied in Article 8 
TRIPS, they form the object and purpose of TRIPS which guides the interpretation and 
implementation of all of its provisions. In paragraph 4 and 5 a) of the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health,4 all WTO Members agreed to this essential guiding role of Articles 
7 and 8, and emphasised this as one of the core elements that allows WTO Members to pursue 
other public interests, such as access to medicines.  
 
Section 4 then builds on the widely accepted role of Articles 7 and 8 described above in order 
to assess the article’s principal research question: what role, if any, do these provisions play in 
an increasingly fragmented international IP system that is driven by bilateral and regional 
agreements which significantly advance the levels of IP protection beyond those agreed in 
TRIPS? These so called ‘TRIPS-plus’ protections are frequently criticised because they 
undermine the ability of WTO Members to rely on the policy space and flexibilities TRIPS 
leaves to design national IP laws in light of domestic needs. As section 2 discusses in detail, 
International Organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), national parliaments, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
academic scholarship all lament the continued expansion of TRIPS-plus standards. They often 
point to duties to respect, protect, and fulfil (socio-economic) human rights, commitments under 
international bio-diversity treaties, or concepts of sustainable development which are arguably 
implicated by TRIPS-plus. What however is missing so far is an analysis of the potential role 
of the existing multilateral IP framework, namely the TRIPS Agreement and its Objectives and 
Principles, in safeguarding the policy space it provides for WTO Members in designing their 
domestic IP systems. This article aims to fill this gap. 
 
In this context, my main argument advanced in section 4 is that as essential expressions of 
TRIPS’ object and purpose, Articles 7 and 8 have an integral character. Integral in the sense 
that provisions of TRIPS which are decisive to achieve the utilitarian objectives and public 
interest principles these Articles set out cannot be derogated from in bilateral or regional 
agreements amongst WTO Members. This argument has its foundation in the idea that there 
are limits on the extent to which some of the parties to a contract can later modify the contract 
inter-se: for example, when rights of other contracting parties are affected, or when a common 
objective of the first contract is undermined. Building on the role of the TRIPS’ objectives and 
principles developed in section 3, international treaty law imposes limits on the extent to which 
WTO Members can derogate from TRIPS provisions, including its flexibilities. After 
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discussing TRIPS-specific conflict norms, section 4 considers the general international law 
principles that govern inter-se modifications of a treaty. Together with the function Articles 7 
and 8 perform for the interpretation of bilateral and regional agreements amongst WTO 
Members, the image of a resilient multilateral system of IP protection emerges: A multilateral 
framework which retains a right for WTO Members to re-balance their domestic IP systems so 
as to promote utilitarian objectives on the domestic level. 
 
My main conclusion in section 5 therefore is that the fragmented advances of IP protection via 
bilateral and regional agreements need to respect TRIPS provisions which are essential to give 
effect to the objectives and principles set out in the TRIPS Agreement. However, because there 
is significant freedom for WTO Members in deciding how to protect public interests, and on 
the most appropriate balance between IP protection and access, the object and purpose of TRIPS 
at best provides a loose constitutional framing for TRIPS-plus protections in bilateral and 
regional agreements. Usually, it will simply allow contracting states to re-balance TRIPS-plus 
protections by introducing suitable exceptions and other limitations to IP protection when 
implementing international IP obligations in their national laws. More generally, such a right 
to re-balance is limited to the range of acceptable understandings of the essential TRIPS 
provisions that the customary rules of treaty interpretation, giving due regard to the object and 
purpose of a treaty, can support. The flexibility and context-specificity inherent in the object 
and purpose of TRIPS make it very difficult to argue that other WTO Members have rights to 
demand specific changes to the implementation of IP obligations in bilateral and regional 
agreements. 
 
Before these principal arguments are developed in sections 3 to 5, section 2 below sets out the 
context that describes the development towards a fragmented international IP system, primarily 
due to the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements that, inter alia, cover IP. 
 
 
2. The Context: Problems Arising from Detailed TRIPS-plus Provisions as Trade-Offs in 
Bilateral and Regional Agreements 
 
In a post-TRIPS environment, international IP law has, despite some early and some more 
recent multilateral advances negotiated at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
in the field of copyright,5 primarily developed via a network of bilateral and regional 
agreements. These range from international investment- and free trade agreements (IIAs, 
FTAs), via treaties on development cooperation, to comprehensive regional integration accords 
– and, for the sake of simplicity, will be referred to here simply as ‘FTAs’. For reasons 
explained below, since the mid-nineties, countries interested in further increasing IP standards 
have had much more success in negotiating IP (as well as other trade and trade-related issues) 
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in fora outside the WTO and WIPO.6 With multilateral solutions increasingly difficult to 
achieve, the world has therefore witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of FTAs. 
 
A brief look at the current numbers of bilateral and regional agreements provides a good 
indication of the scale of this phenomenon: On its website, the WTO, as of mid-2017, counts 
some 659 notifications of so called ‘regional trade agreements’ (RTAs) that had been received 
by the GATT/WTO.7 Of these, 445 are in force. What all RTAs in the WTO have in common 
is that they are reciprocal trade agreements which further liberalise trade between two or more 
countries. As the data from WIPO below suggests, quite a lot of these agreements contain a 
chapter with obligations for the protection and enforcement of IP rights. Typically, IP 
obligations are requested for the benefit of IP-dependent export industries of one (or more) of 
the trading partners – and agreed by the other one(s) in exchange for commitments which 
benefit its own export industries, such as enhanced market access for goods or services.8 In 
2017, WIPO in turn counts 572 IP-related bilateral treaties – a significant portion of which are 
again agreements where enhanced IP protection and enforcement commitments accepted by 
one side function as a trade-off for concessions made by the other side.9  
 
While this is not the place to question the overall welfare effects of such trade-offs or to engage 
in a detailed assessment of whether the benefits outweigh the losses that follow from such 
political decisions, the sustainability of such an approach from a long-term, global perspective 
generally appears doubtful: A trade concession obtained for agreeing to stronger IP rights 
usually derives its main economic value from being exclusive to the export industry of the 
country receiving this concession. Once the same or a similar concession is granted to 
competitors in third countries, the relative advantage is gone. That is why WTO law allows, 
under certain conditions, to shield further trade liberalisation in form of such concessions from 
the application of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.10 In fact, the MFN exception 
creates the principal raison d'être for negotiating agreements – like RTAs and Customs Unions 
– that liberalise trade beyond the multilateral WTO standards. Once however the IP-demanding 
country grants equivalent trade concessions to other countries, the country which had agreed to 
higher IP standards risks to lose the economic benefits it hoped to obtain from the trade 
concession it initially obtained. This form of preference erosion11 calls the rationale for 
agreeing to higher IP standards as a part of a trade-off deal – and thereby the overall concept of 
IP law-making in the trade context – into question. In addition, IP standards driven by the export 
needs of another country hardly ever are those most suited to the domestic needs of innovators, 
creators, users and the general public. 
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Of course, the general idea of negotiating IP as a part of a broader deal is hardly anything new: 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement is generally viewed as the beginning of an era where IP is regulated 
from a trade perspective.12 It nevertheless makes still sense to use TRIPS as the multilateral 
benchmark against which several of the problems identified in bilateral and regional agreements 
are examined and judged. This is justified primarily by the internal balance for which TRIPS is 
increasingly recognised, especially due to the flexibilities that it leaves WTO Members in 
designing their IP system to focus on domestic needs. As section 3 below will show, this balance 
results not least from the objectives and principles of TRIPS, which are amongst the few 
provisions that are primarily informed by proposals of developing countries in the Uruguay 
Round. Another reason to use TRIPS as the normative benchmark against which one assesses 
current trends in international IP norm-setting is that the essentially global consensus reflected 
in TRIPS is often set out in broad principles, rather than detailed and specific rules. These 
principles, interpreted in light of utilitarian objectives expressed in Article 7, offer important 
leeway to respond to societal and technological changes that frequently require law and policy 
makers to adapt, if not completely re-think, IP protection.  
 
One example shall suffice here: the way we use copyrighted content has completely changed 
with the advent of the digital, network environment. One the one hand, identical digital copies 
produced by the click of a mouse and shared through global networks threaten exploitation 
opportunities of right holders. At the same time, in an age where any use of digital content 
implicates (temporary) reproductions, the traditional right to authorise reproduction of 
copyrighted works gives the copyright owner vast powers to control access to and use of such 
works that goes well beyond the analogue environment in which that right initially operated. 
These sea-changes triggered some initial responses in the so called ‘WIPO internet treaties’13 
in 1996 – which now appear antiquated in the context of social media, user-generated content, 
and big data. It is naïve to assume that new responses developed today will continue to offer 
sensible solutions for the technologies that impact on IP tomorrow. 
 
This example shows that IP laws are particularly sensitive to changes in technology and how 
we use it. While TRIPS does not even attempt to deal with the ‘digital revolution’ or global 
communication networks, it generally provides for sufficient leeway to design national systems 
in accordance with domestic needs, and to adapt them to a changing technological environment. 
Today’s IP provisions in bilateral or regional agreements on the other hand are becoming ever 
more detailed, technology-specific and prescriptive: They are often transplants of 
comprehensive IP protection or enforcement approaches that are extracted from the domestic 
law of the IP-demanding country – without consideration whether they fit into the regulatory 
and technological environment of the receiving FTA partner country.14  
 
In addition, what is transplanted often leaves out the corresponding limits of IP protection and 
other checks and balances operating in the law of the transplanting country. Add technological 
specificity, and the resulting transplant is bound to fail in providing any workable solution a 
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few years down the line: For example, the detailed and lengthy provisions on the liability of 
internet services providers (ISPs) which are frequently among those transplanted via FTAs may 
have addressed most of the issues ISPs, content providers and internet users faced in the times 
when the EU and the US as the most common exporters of these rules drafted them (about 15 
years ago).15 These provisions may even be something one can still operationalise so as to cover 
quite a lot of today’s problems – but they hardly will address the core legal questions that field 
will pose tomorrow. This example articulates the threats which an erosion of policy space via 
detailed and specific provisions in FTAs brings along – not only for the country importing such 
detailed rules, but also the country exporting them. Both risk to cast inflexible and 
uncompromising standards into the hard-to-amend stones an international treaty represents.16  
 
In sum, TRIPS-plus provisions (1) represent one side of an often unsustainable trade-off; (2) 
are sometimes transplants from domestic IP laws which are not well-suited in a different 
national context; and (3) become ever more detailed and comprehensive – thereby less suitable 
for a dynamic development of domestic IP laws. Given these problematic consequences that 
result from the proliferation of FTAs containing TRIPS-plus provisions, this article poses the 
question how these agreements relate to the generally flexible IP principles and rules operating 
on the multilateral level, in particular the TRIPS Agreement. Before section 4 scrutinises 
whether the TRIPS Agreement imposes any limits on inter-se modifications of IP protections 
amongst WTO Members, the next section reviews the role of two provisions in TRIPS that are 
central to the analysis in section 4. These TRIPS provisions express the balancing objectives 
and public interest principles which operate on the multilateral level. 
 
 
3. Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS as Patrons of a Flexible Global IP Framework 
 
The ‘Objectives’ expressed in Article 7 and the ‘Principles’ embodied in Article 8 TRIPS 
employ, like so many of TRIPS’ provisions, open and ‘constructively ambiguous’17 terms 
which make their application less straightforward.18 So far, these provisions have not received 
any detailed treatment in the comparably scarce IP case-law generated by the WTO dispute 
settlement body.19 In seeking for clarification, this section begins by a brief review of their 
																																																						
15 See the ‘notice and take-down’ approach in the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as 
well as the limitations on liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Articles 12-15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive 2000/31, and the respective ‘transplants’ of these approaches in EU and US FTAs, such as the US - 
Korea FTA, Chapter 18 (Intellectual Property Rights), Confirmation Letter (Limitations on Liability for Internet 
Service Providers), and, to a lesser extent, Article 11.47 of the EU – Singapore FTA.  
16 See generally Correa et al, 2013, 878. 
17 Terms in TRIPS provisions such as legitimate interests, unreasonable prejudice, discrimination, and unjustifiable 
often involve constructive ambiguity, opting for a meaning that is broad and ambiguous enough to allow all sides 
to agree, thereby essentially providing flexibility in their implementation and leaving contested issues to be 
resolved at a later stage, for example in dispute settlement proceedings, or allowing diverging approaches in 
domestic implementation; see generally Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2007, 475. 
18 On Article 8 TRIPS see for example Gervais, 2012, 238; Blakeney, 1996, para.3.09; ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 
126; Yusuf, 1998, 13; Ganesan, 2015, 221; Correa, 2007, 108. On Article 7 TRIPS see Slade, 2011, at 414; Pires 
de Carvalho, 2014, 164-65 & 191-192; Correa, 2007, 99-103; ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 131-132; Malbon, 
Lawson & Davison, 2014, 194-195. 
19 At the time of writing, the Panel Report in the dispute over Australia’s plain packaging measures – which, based 
on the arguments made by the parties, is likely to involve a significant discussion on Articles 7 and 8 – had not yet 
negotiation history in section 3.1. While the travaux préparatoires as such do not form a 
primary source of guidance in the customary rules on treaty interpretation,20 it offers useful 
insights into understanding key concepts used in Articles 7 and 8, and suggests how these norms 
intended to operate.  The negotiation history also shows important changes that were introduced 
prior to the final, agreed versions of the text. Given the limited guidance that follows from the 
ordinary meaning of the broad and ambiguous term central to both Articles 7 and 8, the travaux 
of these provisions provides us with an initial understanding of the intentions of those who 
introduced them into TRIPS. Against this background, section 3.1 further explores different 
possible ways to comprehend and apply these provisions. 
 
Section 3.2 then highlights the common understanding of Articles 7 and 8 all WTO Members 
expressed in the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The section will show 
that, as a subsequent agreement on the interpretation of TRIPS under Article 31 (3) a) VCLT, 
the Doha Declaration offers important guidance on the function and operation of Articles 7 and 
8. As the principal expressions of the object and purpose of TRIPS, these provisions have first 
and foremost an interpretative function. In this way, they affect the proper understanding of all 
IP provisions covered by TRIPS.  
 
Section 3.3 shows that in order to give effect both to the substantive meaning and to the 
interpretative function of Articles 7 and 8, the balancing objective and public interest principles 
afford significant discretion to WTO Members in their domestic implementation of TRIPS. The 
call in Article 7 for IP protection and enforcement to achieve utilitarian goals, and the idea of 
Article 8 to allow WTO Members to protect public interests necessarily implies to have 
appropriate regard to domestic circumstances. WTO Members should construe their TRIPS 
obligations, of course within the accepted limits of treaty interpretation under customary 
international law, accordingly.  
 
Section 3.4 finally focuses on the mounting concerns that have been raised against how policy 
space and flexibility within TRIPS can be affected by TRIPS-plus rules. All this sets the ground 
for the core question then addressed in section 4: what role do Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS play 
for subsequent IP agreements amongst WTO Members? In particular what limits, if any, follow 
from these provisions for inter-se modifications in form of the detailed and comprehensive IP 
provisions commonly found in FTAs? 
 
 
3.1 The Basic Idea of Tailoring IP protection to Domestic Needs, and Mindful of the Wider 
Public Interest 
 
With the simple title ‘Objectives’, Article 7 TRIPS states:  
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
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disputes, see Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2011a.  
20 See Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331. 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations.21 
The first impression Article 7 conveys is one of a rather dense and convoluted sentence where 
several (but certainly not all)22 objectives of an IP system come together, joined by an 
overarching notion of balance. In a similar way, an initial look at Article 8 (1), entitled 
‘Principles’, leaves the reader somewhat puzzled. In its final version, this provision states: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.23 
Article 8 (2) TRIPS then more specifically allows measures ‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology’ – but again subjects those to a TRIPS 
consistency test. The following analysis focuses on Article 8 (1), because as the more general 
norm, it better captures the core public interest principle that is essential for the object and 
purpose of TRIPS. As the only horizontal provision within TRIPS that refers to national 
measures protecting public interests, Article 8 nevertheless does not appear to function as 
‘general exception clause’ akin to, for example, Article XX GATT, since the former includes 
the requirement that measures must be consistent with TRIPS provisions. 
 
 
3.1.1 Negotiation History 
 
The origins of both Article 7 and 8 (1) lie in a 1989 Communication from India to the 
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights during the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.24 With regard to Article 7, the Communication 
emphasised under the heading ‘Balance of rights and obligations’ that ‘international 
conventions on intellectual property rights clearly recognise the basic principle that there must 
be a balance between the rights and obligations of the owner of intellectual property.’25 Some 
months later, a common proposal by several developing countries on trade related aspects of IP 
rights within the GATT system26 incorporated the idea for such a balance in its Article 1 
(‘Objectives’) as well as in Article 2 (‘Principles’): Article 1 (1) of that proposal concerns the 
																																																						
21 Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement (emphasis added). 
22 The emphasis on innovation incentives and technology transfer implies (for historical reasons explained below) 
a strong focus on patents and other rights vesting in technology – while especially the objectives of trademark 
protection and most traditional aspects of copyright protection are not explicitly addressed.  
23 Article 8 (1) TRIPS (emphasis added). 
24 See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Communication from India, Applicability of the Basic 
Principles of the GATT and of Relevant International Intellectual Property Conventions (5 September 1989, 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/39), para.13&14. 
25 Ibid, para.13. As an example for such a balance, the communication refers to Art.5A PC and the ability for 
compulsory licensing of patents in cases of abuse. 
26 See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the 
GATT and of Relevant International Intellectual Property Conventions (14 May 1990, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71). 
The text therein was later endorsed by two other developing countries, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. It became known 
as the ‘developing countries’ proposal’; see Gervais, 2012, 20.  
balance between ‘the needs for economic, social and technological development of all 
countries’ and ‘the rights granted to IPR holders’ – while section (2) refers to the ‘principal 
rights and obligations of IP owners’ and ‘the important inter-relationships between the scope 
of such rights and obligations and the promotion of social welfare and economic 
development.’27 Article 2 in turn contains in section (1) and (3) the following provisions that 
later appear verbatim in the first official version of the ‘Chairman’s Draft’ (or ‘Composite Draft 
Text’) prepared by the Chairman Lars Anell of the Negotiating Group on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in July 1990 in order to identify conflicts and overlaps 
in main proposals made so far: 
(1) Parties recognize that intellectual property rights are granted not only in 
acknowledgement of the contributions of inventors and creators, but also to assist in the 
diffusion of technological knowledge and its dissemination to those who could benefit 
from it in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and agree that this balance 
of rights and obligations inherent in all systems of intellectual property rights should be 
observed. (…) 
(3) Parties agree that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and enhance the 
international transfer of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge.28 
 
The text of Article 7 was further modified in subsequent drafts of 1 October, 25 October and 
especially of 13 November 1990 where the two sections above are combined into the condensed 
form Article 7 has now.29 While the main text of section (1) was lost when it is merged into 
section (2), the essential ideas that IP systems should be ‘conducive to social and economic 
welfare’ and contribute to a ‘balance of rights and obligations’ are retained. The lost text of 
section (1) would have been a more forceful expression that IP rights are also about 
dissemination and transfer of technology – but this idea was already well captured in section 
(2) and remains so in the final version of Article 7. In sum, the changes from the developing 
country proposal to the final version primarily are about reducing overlaps and redundancies – 
but hardly affect the main substance of Article 7 TRIPS. In its essence, the agreed text of the 
provision indicates the balance that IP protection and enforcement is meant to achieve: for 
example between producers and users of technology. As this balancing is meant to induce socio-
economic welfare, the TRIPS ‘Objectives’ express WTO Members’ common understanding of 
IP as a utilitarian tool. 
 
The negotiating history of Article 8 (1) on the other hand reveals that this provision had 
undergone significant changes from the 1989 Communication of India to the current text. In 
particular, early versions did not require measures to be consistent with other treaty provisions. 
																																																						
27 Ibid, 7. See also Article 1 (3) & (4) of that proposal. 
28 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations - Chairman’s Report to the Group of Negotiation on Goods, Status of 
Work in the Negotiating Group, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, (23 July 1990, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76), 9-10 (Articles 8B.1 & 8B.3). The 
draft was first circulated on 12 June 1990 under the chair’s sole responsibility; its official version then appeared 
in July 1990. On this and the overall TRIPS negotiating history and the pivotal role of this draft see Gervais, 2012, 
11-31. 
29 See Gervais, 2012, 228-229. 
Quite to the contrary, the 1989 Communication referred to the ‘[p]rimacy of public interest’ as 
a ‘principle which is closely related to the balance of rights and obligations’.30 Under this 
principle ‘[t]he state has the inherent right to take measures in public interest abridging the 
rights of holders of intellectual property rights.’ Such measures can be taken ‘in pursuance of 
vital concerns as security, public health, nutrition, agricultural development, poverty alleviation 
and the like.’31 The notion of giving primacy to public interest hence suggests an initial 
intention of crafting a general exception rule. While this idea is difficult to uphold in light of 
subsequent changes discussed below, the types of public interests mentioned by India and the 
use of terms like ‘vital’ match subsequent drafts of Art.8 and its current text. Conceptually, the 
public interest principle expressed here appears as a broad version of the ‘right to regulate’ to 
protect public interests in a non-discriminatory and proportional manner, recognised under 
customary international law and nowadays frequently applied in international investment law.32 
 
The idea of a general public interest exception that allows to override IP protection then found 
its way into the first proposal by several developing countries on trade related aspects of IP 
rights within the GATT system. Yusuf and Ganesan confirm that the main intention was to 
preserve sufficient flexibility for domestic measures protecting public interests that could come 
into conflict with IP rights.33 In section (2) of Article 2, retaining the entitlement as ‘Principles’ 
from India’s earlier submission,34 the developing country proposal provided that  
‘[i]n formulating or amending their national laws and regulations on IPRs, Parties 
have the right to adopt appropriate measures to protect public morality, national 
security, public health and nutrition, or to promote public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development.’35 
This text reappeared unchanged in the first consolidated ‘Chairman’s Draft’ of TRIPS in July 
1990.36 In the subsequent drafts of 25 October, 13 and 20 November 1990 however, various 
versions of a TRIPS consistency test, effectively countering the idea of a general exception 
provision akin to Article XX GATT, found its way into the text of Article 8.37 The travaux, 
academic writings, as well as recollections of the TRIPS negotiations by key individuals 
																																																						
30 Communication from India, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant International 
Intellectual Property Conventions, para.14. As discussed above, the idea for a ‘balance of rights and obligations’ 
of IP owners arguably served as input to the identical language now found in Article 7 TRIPS. 
31 Ibid. For a discussion on related submissions (again from India) which further refer to the need to balance IP 
and public interests see ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 121-122 and Ganesan, 2015, 221. 
32 Philip Morris vs Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Award, 8 July 2016 (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7), para.287-
306; Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 
(Award, May 29, 2003), para.119; Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Partial Award, 
17 March 2006), paras.255, 260, 262; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (Final 
Award, 3 August 2005) Part IV, Ch.D, para.7.; see also OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment - 2004/4 (Sept. 
2004), (RLA-238), 5, n.10; and American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations of the United 
States (1987), vol. 1, (RLA-257), 712, comment (g). 
33 Yusuf, 1998, 12-13; Ganesan, 2015, 226. 
34 In light of the significant similarities between the 1989 proposal by India and the first developing country draft 
it appears very likely that the term ‘principles‘ had simply been carried over from India’s reference to public 
interest primacy as a principle that allows to override IP protections. 
35 Communication from Argentina et al, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant 
International Intellectual Property Conventions, 7 (emphasis added). 
36 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations - Chairman’s Report (W/76), 9-10. 
37 See Gervais, 2012, 236-237. 
involved unfortunately do not offer a clear explanation who requested this change, and why it 
was accepted.38 The following so called ‘Brussels Draft’39 of December 1990 which already 
largely resembled the final Marrakesh version of TRIPS then manifested the consistency test 
as crucial requirement in Article 8 (1). Adding also a necessity requirement in relation to 
national measures protecting public interests, it stated: 
Provided that PARTIES do not derogate from the obligations arising under this 
agreement, they may, in formulating or amending their national laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development.40 
While subsequent changes to the text led to slight modifications, the final text of Article 8 (1) 
retains the TRIPS consistency test as its perhaps most important requirement.  
 
 
3.1.2 Balancing Objectives and Public Interest Principles: Exploring Possible Meanings 
 
What then follows from the negotiation history for construing the meaning of Articles 7 and 8? 
As for the ‘Objectives’ of TRIPS expressed in Article 7, its convoluted substance appears 
difficult to grasp and turn into legally meaningful and operational terms of an international 
treaty. The original intention of the drafters was most likely to highlight the social function of 
IP protection – in particular for rights vested in technology – as a means to facilitate ‘social and 
economic welfare’, rather than being an end in itself.41 This finds further support in the 
preambular recognition that IP rights, even as private rights, serve a utilitarian purpose.42 In 
order to achieve this overarching goal, IP protection must weigh the two intermediate aims of 
‘promotion of technological innovation’ against the ‘transfer and dissemination of technology’. 
This in turn requires a ‘balance of rights and obligations’ – these being rights and obligations 
of the ‘owners of intellectual property’ (and hence not those of WTO Members).43 Developing 
countries had in fact suggested several specific obligations for IP owners as they feared 
potential abuses, monopoly prices and trade imbalances resulting from the strengthened IP 
																																																						
38 The account of the Brazilian negotiator, Piragibe dos Santos Tarragô, suggests that while Articles 7 and 8 were 
overall concessions made by developed countries, the ‘demandeurs’ of TRIPS 'made sure that the eventual 
measures taken under national legislations, in the light of those objectives and principles, should be consistent 
with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement’; see Tarragô, 2015, 250. 
39 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations - Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft final act embodying the results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Brussels Draft) (3 December 1990, 
MTN.TNC/W/35/REV.1). 
40 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations - Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft final act embodying the results 
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Brussels Draft) (3 December 1990, 
MTN.TNC/W/35/REV.1), Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, 200 (Art.8:1 (Principles) – emphasis added. 
41 See Pires de Carvalho, 2014, 164-65 & 191-192; Ganesan, 2015, 221. 
42 See the Preamble of TRIPS.  
43 See Communication from India, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant International 
Intellectual Property Conventions, para.13. The subsequent developing country draft actually contained an Article 
5 which was entitled ‘Rights and Obligations of Patent Owners’ and contained a list of both rights (for example to 
prevent others from working the invention and to license its use) and obligations (for example to disclose the 
invention and work it in the territory of the granting state) of patent owners; see Communication from Argentina, 
Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant International Intellectual Property Conventions, 
8-9 and the discussion by Ganesan, 2015, 221-222. 
rights proposed by developed countries.44 While these proposals for explicit obligations have 
generally not materialized into agreed TRIPS provisions,45 the call for IP protection and 
enforcement to contribute to a balance of rights and obligations of IP owners still stands. The 
terms that eventually ended up as ‘Objectives’ in Article 7 therefore represent – together with 
the public interest ‘Principles’ of Article 8 – the main TRIPS provisions that are primarily 
informed by concerns of developing countries. In that regard, they also form an important part 
of the political bargain that led to the TRIPS Agreement.46  
 
Article 7 therefore stands against a one-sided approach to IP protection that solely focusses on 
the interests of right holders and maximizes their incentives to innovate. In order to promote 
the overarching goal of socio-economic welfare, domestic IP systems of WTO Members should 
balance: (1) the intermediate ends of promoting innovation and facilitating technology transfer; 
(2) the interests of producers and users (of technological knowledge); and (3) the rights and 
obligations of IP owners. In other words: For IP regulation to serve wider societal goals, it must 
mediate between IP protection on the one hand, and access to as well as use of protected 
material on the other. This in turn requires to weigh the interests, rights and obligations of all 
stakeholders involved. While it is correct that the terms in Article 7 more narrowly focus on 
rights vesting in technology, this is explained by the particular concerns that triggered its early 
drafts and should not prevent interpreters from extrapolating the underlying principle of 
balancing.47 All this of course does not offer very much concrete guidance since neither the 
process of the balancing exercise, nor its outcome, and not even the authority who is meant to 
conduct this exercise is addressed in Article 7. Before the next two sections clarify these aspects 
further, the basic meaning of Article 8 (1) needs to be explored.  
 
The negotiation history of Article 8 (1) has shown that what was intended to serve as a general 
exception clause based on the idea of primacy of public interest over the rights of IP owners 
had been made subject to the requirement of consistency with other provisions in TRIPS. What 
then, does this test of consistency with TRIPS mean? While commentators offer various 
approaches and solutions,48 one WTO Panel has tried to tackle this issue. In the European 
Communities – Geographical Indications (EC – GIs) dispute, the same question arose when the 
EC essentially argued it should be able to rely on the General Exceptions in Article XX GATT 
																																																						
44 Pires de Carvalho, 2014, 192; Correa, 2007, 92-93; ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 119. A list of examples for the 
fears expressed over strengthening IP protection and the need for strong limits as well as obligations imposed on 
IP owners can be found in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Communication from Brazil, 
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods 
(31 October 1988, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/30). 
45 A notable exception is the disclosure requirement in Art.29 TRIPS – which however does oblige WTO Members 
to require the applicant to disclose the ‘best mode for carrying out the invention’ (as proposed by developing 
countries). 
46 See Ganesan, 2015, 221-226, Tarragô, 2015, 250, and generally on political bargains and pressure in the 
negotiations, Sell, 2003, 108-120. Given that Article 8 (1) has received a significant qualification in form of the 
TRIPS consistency test, Article 7 probably embodies the main victory among those TRIPS provisions where 
developing countries appeared as demandeurs. 
47 Correa, 2007, 92 argues that since promoting socio-economic goals and the idea of balance well accepted in 
WTO law (as expressed for example in the notion of sustainable development in the Preamble to the WTO 
Agreement), Article 7 is of key relevance for all IP rights. The Preamble to the WCT and the Preamble to the 
Marrakesh Treaty further support these concepts as general principles in IP law. 
48 See for example Gervais, 2012, 238; ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 125-27; Yusuf, 1998, 13; Correa, 2007, 108. 
to justify a breach of the TRIPS national treatment rule. 49  It apparently felt that because of the 
limits imposed through the consistency test in Article 8 (1) TRIPS, a GATT-equivalent general 
exception should be available, but was missing under TRIPS. In response, the Panel tried to 
provide a specific explanation why it felt that there is no need for a general exception for public 
interests within the TRIPS Agreement and why the principles in Article 8 (1) TRIPS – despite 
its consistency test – are sufficient. It stated: 
These principles reflect the fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not generally provide 
for the grant of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but rather provides 
for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts.  This fundamental feature of 
intellectual property protection inherently grants Members freedom to pursue legitimate 
public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public policy objectives lie 
outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an exception under 
the TRIPS Agreement.50 
 
The Panel hence argued that there is no need for an Article XX GATT-style exception under 
TRIPS because of the nature of IP rights as negative rights to exclude others from using the 
protected subject – instead of a positive right against the state to commercialise or use protected 
subject matter in the market. For the Panel, this feature allows to pursue public policy objectives 
without interfering with these (negative) rights. Indeed, construing IP rights as negative rights 
under TRIPS51 usually allows governments to impose regulatory controls on the utilisation and 
exploitation of IP-protected content. TRIPS itself assumes in Article 39 (3) that pharmaceutical 
and agricultural-chemical products are subject to marketing approval procedures; and WTO 
Members have long imposed a whole range of measures – from price controls, via labelling 
requirements, to sale restrictions – that affect the commercial exploitation of IP-protected goods 
or services. As none of these measures would interfere with an obligation to provide right 
holders with a negative right to exclude, Article 8 (1) would then have no more than a 
declaratory function. 
 
However, the realisation of public policy objectives quite often will require interference with 
the negative right to prevent others from exploiting the protected subject matter. Whenever the 
public interest demands making protected subject matter available to certain interest groups 
and/or for a specific purpose, such access or use will conflict with the concept that the right 
holder can prevent most (commercially relevant) uses of the protected subject matter. In fact, 
the private rights nature of IP highlighted in the TRIPS Preamble implies that these rights exist 
primarily in opposition to claims by other private parties (competitors, users) over what is 
exclusively allocated to the IP owner. It is then equally in the nature of these private rights that 
in order to realise their overall utilitarian purpose or to give effect to a specific public interest 
for access to or use of something otherwise protected, their negative, exclusionary character 
vis-à-vis others must be limited. For example, making affordable generic medicines available 
to the public while the relevant drug is still under patent protection interferes with the exclusive 
																																																						
49 European Communities – Geographical Indications (EC – GIs), Panel Report (15 March 2005, WT/DS/174R), 
at para.7.205-207. 
50 EC – GIs, para.7.210. 
51 See Articles 11, 14:1-3, 16:1, 23:1, 26:1, 28:1, 39:2 TRIPS which all oblige WTO Members to provide exclusive 
rights to ‘prevent’ third parties from using the protected subject matter in various ways. 
rights under Article 28 (1) TRIPS. More generally speaking: as soon as the public interest in 
question cannot be achieved by state-imposed limits on the right holder’s exploitation of IP, but 
requires access to or use of IP by state authorities, public bodies or private parties, the concept 
of negative rights alone does not ensure that the relevant public interest can be realised.  
 
In these situations, ways and means to limit the exclusive, private IP rights which TRIPS obliges 
to grant are needed to guarantee a proper balancing of interests. As the TRIPS preamble 
highlights: these private rights serve a public, utilitarian function.52 Those rights hence are not 
absolute, but subject to various limitations which, for example, authorise a certain (limited) use 
of the protected subject matter by a (limited) group of beneficiaries.53 Of course, TRIPS does 
contain specific provisions that allow, under certain conditions, WTO Members to introduce 
such exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights in domestic law.54 The very existence of 
these exception and limitation provisions however raises further questions about the role and 
function of Article 8 (1) TRIPS: if only the former allow to curtail exclusive rights and the 
concept of negative rights allows measures that merely affect the (commercial) exploitation of 
IP-protected goods, what remains for Article 8 (1)? The next section tries to develop an 
understanding of Article 8 (1) and its consistency test that, in accordance with the principle of 




3.2 Articles 7 and 8 in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health  
 
An initial enquiry into the negotiation history as well as the substance of Articles 7 and 8 has 
left several questions open. This section shows how the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health56 as well as the Doha Declaration that kicked off a new Round of Trade Negotiations in 
the WTO57 offered essential guidance on how public interests – such as public health in general 
and access to medicines in particular – can be given effect in the context of the TRIPS 
Agreement. These Declarations are equally instructive on the role WTO Members foresee for 
the balancing objectives of Article 7 TRIPS. As subsequent agreements on the interpretation of 
TRIPS in accordance with Article 31 (3) (a) VCLT,58 they show how WTO Members agreed 
for Article 7 and 8 to operate. 
 
																																																						
52 See the discussion in section 1. 
53 Other forms of limiting the exclusivity conferred by IP rights are subject matter exclusions, setting thresholds 
for obtaining protection, constraining the scope of exclusive rights, and of course limiting the duration of these 
rights. TRIPS contains rules on most of these issues for most of the relevant IP rights. 
54 Such as Articles 13, 17, 26 (2), 30 and 31 TRIPS. 
55 See Article 31 (1) VCLT. 
56 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. 
57 WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Development Round (20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1). 
58 In particular the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health is generally seen as a ‘subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ and is thereby 
equivalent to treaty ‘context’ – see Abbott, 2002, 491-492; and generally Charnovitz, 2002. For a view that 
classifies the Doha Declaration as (arguably even more important) ‘authoritative interpretation’ under Article IX 
(2) of the WTO Agreement see Shanker, 2002.  
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, issued unanimously by all WTO Members 
in November 2001, is a response to concerns about the impact of strong IP protection on 
domestic health policies which developing countries had already expressed during the Uruguay 
Round, and which reached global prominence through the aggressive campaigns by some 
developed countries and pharma-companies against South Africa and Brazil, which – facing an 
unprecedented HIV/AIDS epidemic, high prices for drugs and overstretched health budgets – 
adopted national legislation that allowed to limit patent rights in order to facilitate affordable 
access to medication.59 While especially the US and its pharmaceutical industry initially 
objected fiercely to a Declaration that would highlight the policy space within TRIPS for 
limiting IP rights to promote affordable access to medicines, the 9/11 attacks on the US and the 
threat of an anthrax virus epidemic shortly thereafter forced the Bush Administration to rethink 
its position: it could not plausibly argue against, for example, compulsory licensing to tackle 
public health issues in the WTO and at the same time threaten Bayer, the patent holder for 
ciprofloxacin, with the same in order to obtain affordable access to sufficient stocks of this 
crucial medication against the anthrax virus.60 In the course of the consultations at the Doha 
Ministerial in November 2001, developed countries also realised that any progress on core 
issues they wished to include in a new Trade Round required concessions on TRIPS and Public 
Health in exchange. Eventually, the agreement on a ‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health’ reached on 14 November 2001 resembled to a large extend earlier proposals 
made by African states. 
 
The Doha Declaration is usually known for mandating the TRIPS Council to find a solution to 
the catch-22 situation of those WTO Members that could not benefit from their right to issue a 
compulsory license (CL) for a patented medicine (due to insufficient domestic manufacturing 
capacity) and could not rely on imported drugs produced under a CL abroad (something which 
Art.31 f TRIPS significantly curtails).61 It also clarifies the policy space WTO Members enjoy 
when taking measures to protect public health, primarily by indicating several specific IP tools 
such as compulsory licensing and parallel importation which provide flexibility for this 
purpose. Most importantly for this article, paragraph 4 and 5 a) of the Declaration indicate the 
common intention of WTO Members on how to operationalise the balancing objectives and 
public interest principles of TRIPS. In paragraph 4, WTO Members  
																																																						
59 South Africa had enacted health reform laws (especially a newly introduced sec.15C of the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act) which allowed for compulsory licensing and parallel importation of patented 
drugs. In response, the US placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watchlist and withdrew tariff preferences; while 
the Pharma lobby initiated litigation in South Africa, inter alia invoking its right to property under sec.25 of the 
South African Constitution. The focus of attack in Brazil was its compulsory licensing legislation within the 
framework of its HIV/AIDS treatment programme which the US challenged to be incompatible with TRIPS (see 
WT/DS199/39 – Brazil, Measures Affecting Patent Protection). Due to public awareness campaigns and protests 
by various NGO both cases ended in withdrawal of claims and a public relations disaster for Pharma, the US and 
others (such as the EU) who had favoured ‘patents over patients’. See Hestermeyer, 2007, 11-15; and generally 
Varella, 2004; Abbott, 2002. 
60 Ironically, it was an offer by CIPLA, an Indian Generic Drug Producer, to supply the US and Canada generic 
versions of Bayer’s Cipro drug that facilitated agreements between Bayer and the Canadian as well as the US 
Government for significantly lower prices for the anthrax treatment; see Hestermeyer, 2007, 16-17. 
61 The main alternative in form of importing from other countries where the needed medication was not under 
patent protection was about to disappear as the transition period during which developing countries like India, the 
biggest producer of generic drugs and potential supplier for other developing countries, were exempted from 
granting product patent protection for pharmaceuticals was due to expire in January 2005. On the so called 
‘paragraph 6 system’ see generally Matthews, 2004. 
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to 
the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.  
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.62 
Paragraph 5 a) then lists as the first and arguably only flexibility with horizontal application 
throughout TRIPS that ‘[i]n applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.’63 
Another Ministerial Declaration adopted in Doha, initiating the ‘Doha Development Round’ of 
trade negotiations, confirms that the objectives and principles referred to are those ‘set out in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.’64  
 
As an interpretative agreement under Article 31 (3) (a) VCLT, the Doha Declaration makes two 
essential points here: (1) Promoting public health and access to medicines primarily occurs via 
treaty interpretation and implementation in a way which ensures that TRIPS does not prevent 
WTO Members from taking domestic measures to this effect. (2) Such interpretation and 
implementation is first and foremost secured by reading all TRIPS provisions in light of the 
balancing objectives of Article 7, and the public interests principles expressed in Article 8. For 
Article 8 (1), this approach based on treaty interpretation and implementation allows to 
overcome the tension between the provision’s core function as a public interest principle and 
its TRIPS consistency test. Adopting measures necessary to protect public interests, such as 
public health as general example and access to medicines as a more specific case, does not 
require a General Exception clause – because TRIPS obligations to protect IP are meant to be 
construed in a way that does not interfere with WTO Member’s right to protect public interests. 
In this way, the Doha Declaration clarifies the common intention of all WTO Members to retain, 
within TRIPS, a right to regulate that bears strong resemblance to that right under customary 
international law.65 In order to ensure horizontal application of the public interest principles in 
Article 8, WTO Members have highlighted their role as forming an essential part of the object 
and purpose of TRIPS – which in turn should ensure that Article 8 will be considered for any 
interpretation exercise involving public interests under TRIPS. The utilitarian function of 
private property rights expressed in the TRIPS preamble further supports such a horizontal role 
of the public interest principles. 
 
With regard to the balancing objectives expressed in Article 7, the main clarification Doha 
brings along is to confirm its status as object and purpose of TRIPS – thereby guiding the 
interpretation of each and every provision in TRIPS. In the words of the Appellate Body, a 
WTO treaty objective will ‘add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the 
																																																						
62 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Doha Development Round Declaration, para.19.  
65 Compare for example Philip Morris vs Uruguay, para.287-306 (and the further reference there provided). 
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement’.66 By referring to ‘the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law’, the Doha Declaration links to the accepted principles 
of treaty interpretation, expressed in Articles 31-33 VCLT. While this is not the place to engage 
in an in-depth discussion on the role of object and purpose vis-à-vis ordinary meaning and 
context in a holistic interpretative exercise,67 it suffices to state that the balancing objectives of 
Article 7 have a particularly important role to play whenever construing open and ambiguous 
terms within TRIPS: even under a ‘textual approach’ sometimes attributed to the adjudicative 
organs in the WTO,68 the Appellate Body has emphasised that ‘where the meaning imparted by 
the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the 
reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole 
may usefully be sought’.69 The role of Article 7 is further amplified by the fact that TRIPS is 
arguably the only WTO Agreement with an operative Article that is entitled ‘Objectives’ – 
which all WTO Members subsequently agreed to guide the interpretation of ‘each provision of 
the TRIPS Agreement’70. 
 
In sum, the common intention of all WTO Members expressed in the Doha Declaration 
significantly advances the proper understanding of the role the balancing objectives in Article 
7 and the public interest principles in Article 8 play within TRIPS: By guiding the interpretation 
of all of its provisions, both norms have horizontal impact. Article 8 (1) primarily ensures that 
TRIPS obligations which may affect the ability of WTO Members to adopt measures to protect 
public interests shall be construed ‘in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect 
public health’, as well as other public interests recognised in Article 8. This means that TRIPS 
must be interpreted to allow such measures – to the extent possible in light of the ordinary 
meaning and context of the relevant TRIPS provisions. The balancing objectives in Article 7 
on the other hand inform all TRIPS provisions whose interpretation and implementation calls 
for policy choices – choices where the utilitarian goals highlighted in Article 7 play a role. This 
will primarily relate to TRIPS provisions where broad, open and ambiguous terms leave space 
for more than one defensible meaning and where the treaty interpreter and implementer are 
called to exercise this discretion in light of the balancing objectives. As the next section will 
confirm, this balancing ‘conducive to socio-economic welfare’ can effectively only be 
performed by national IP law- and policy makers, on the domestic level. 
 
 
3.3 Discretion for Balancing in Domestic Implementation of TRIPS 
 
An open question that remains is how the call for balance in Article 7 as TRIPS’ object and 
purpose can be operationalized? Given that Article 7 uses ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’, it 
arguably does not involve an enforceable obligation for WTO Members to engage in balancing 
																																																						
66 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimp), Appellate Body 
Report, 12 October 1998 (WT/DS58/AB/R), para.153. 
67 See generally Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2010.   
68 See the discussion in Howse, 2000 and Van Damme, 2009. 
69 US – Shrimp, para.114. In that case, sustainable development as one element of the multiple objectives of the 
WTO agreement guided the interpretation of the Article XX (g) GATT term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ to 
include the protection of living (but endangered) species such as sea turtles. 
70 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, para.5 a). 
exercises when designing their domestic IP laws; nor does it require a particular (balanced) 
outcome.71 Instead, its interpretative function suggests that it primarily enhances flexibility in 
determining the meaning of broad and open terms that can be found in many TRIPS provisions. 
Significant room to fine-tune the substance of TRIPS obligations exists for example with regard 
to terms such as ‘expressions’ (in contrast to ideas), ‘intellectual creations’, ‘inventions’, 
‘distinctiveness’, ‘likelihood of confusion’, ‘inventive step’, ‘industrial application’, 
‘discrimination’, ‘ordre public’, ‘morality’, ‘legitimate’, ‘unjustifiable’, ‘unreasonable 
prejudice’, ‘normal exploitation’, ‘predominantly’, ‘exhaustion’, ‘abuse of intellectual property 
rights’, ‘adverse effect’ (on ‘trade’ or ‘competition’), ‘unfair’ (‘competition’ or ‘commercial 
use’), ‘fair and equitable’, ‘effective’, ‘adequate’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘commercial scale’.72  
 
If the balancing objectives in Article 7 hence widen the scope for construing the many broad 
and ambiguous terms in TRIPS in light of the overarching goal of facilitating economic welfare, 
the central question of course is who should be performing this balancing exercise? Is this a 
task that is primarily assigned to the WTO’s adjudicative organs, in their endeavour to ‘clarify 
the existing provisions of [the WTO] agreements’73 – or is this for WTO Members to decide, 
which are arguably much better placed to determine domestic implementation of IP laws in a 
way that promotes socio-economic welfare? While the role of WTO Panels and the Appellate 
Body surely is to clarify the meaning of TRIPS, including its more general and ambiguous 
treaty terms, Article 3 (2) DSU requires this clarification to be conducted ‘in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law’74. Based on Article 31 VCLT, this 
includes taking due account of the treaty’s object and purpose, here in particular Articles 7 and 
8. As has been shown above with regard to the public interest principles and as will be shown 
below regarding the balancing objectives, the substance and meaning of these provisions 
however demands a strong emphasis on implementation and decision-making on the domestic 
level.  
 
This is because the idea of balancing the various interests at stake in the regulation of IP 
necessarily implies responsiveness to the individual circumstances within a WTO Member 
State: IP rights are territorial and the incentives they are meant to offer, as well as the degree of 
access they afford, first and foremost have an effect within the domestic setting of the country 
granting such an IP right. Tailoring the regulation of IP with the aim to generate (and perhaps 
even optimise) welfare effects can only really work on the domestic level. This in turn 
necessarily assumes some discretion for Member States as to allow for such tailored responses 
to the developmental, technological and economic needs of their societies. In particular, the 
implementation of broader and vague legal terms in TRIPS provisions that bear on the interests 
to be balanced under Article 7 implies policy space for WTO Members in determining the 
appropriate balance with the specific domestic circumstances in mind.  
 
Of course, tailored regulation of IP in a domestic economy that attracts foreign investments or 
serves as an important market for (IP-protected) products abroad has spill-over effects on 
																																																						
71 See also Pires de Carvalho, 2014, 192. 
72 See Articles 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 27, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 61 TRIPS.  
73 Article 3 (2) DSU. 
74 Ibid. 
welfare abroad. That however is essentially the result of open markets in a globalised economy, 
and harmonisation through TRIPS minimum standards is reflecting the IP part of this. Foreign 
right holders can expect adherence to these standards. But these standards bind states, and 
require domestic implementation by WTO Members who ‘shall be free to determine the 
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of [TRIPS] within their own legal system 
and practice’.75 These flexibilities to fine-tune such standards into specific protections in 
national IP laws are an inherent part of the deal agreed in the Uruguay Round – which certainly 
did not create a global uniform IP law. Tailoring IP protection to domestic needs further 
corresponds to the recognition of ‘the underlying public policy objectives’ of domestic IP 
systems. All this leaves little doubt that the balancing Article 7 calls for can effectively only be 
conducted on the domestic level. 
 
A further question here will often be to what extent this weighing process has already been 
performed by the negotiators while drafting TRIPS provisions or is to be conducted on the 
implementation level by the individual WTO Member States.76 While this will depend to some 
extent on the individual TRIPS provision, some general observations can be made: Firstly, the 
use of ‘should’ in Article 7 suggests that the desired effects are not achieved automatically and 
do not follow as such from any mode of protecting and enforcing IP rights.77 Neither are these 
effects necessarily inherent and fully realised in all the individual TRIPS provisions. Had this 
been the case, Article 7 would be redundant as an operational provision.78 Instead, the concept 
of balancing in Article 7 makes most sense if understood as a task where the national legislator 
should consider the objectives and interests mentioned in Article 7 and choose a proper balance 
when implementing TRIPS. This finds further confirmation in paragraph 5 of the Doha 
Declaration where WTO Members highlight the ‘right of WTO Members to use’ Article 7 as a 
key flexibility within TRIPS.79 Such a right to use Article 7 arguably implies that it is in 
principle up to the WTO Members to conduct the balancing that Article calls for.  
 
Further, the very objective mentioned in Article 7, to advance social and economic welfare, 
necessitates at least a certain amount of flexibility and policy space to give due regard to the 
domestic needs of the society. This follows not only from economic theory on IP protection 
where a crucial common denominator is that in pursuing utilitarian goals via IP protection, one 
size does not fit all.80 Also historical evidence from the IP policies of industrialised countries 
																																																						
75 Article 1 (1) TRIPS. 
76 This issue has been discussed in particular in relation to Article 30 TRIPS: see Canada – Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products (Canada – Patents), Panel Report (WT/DS114/R), para.7.26 and Correa, 2007, 101-
102. While the EC contended that the balancing Article 7 calls for is already fully implemented in the individual 
provisions of TRIPS, Canada argued for that WTO Members retain policy space to conduct such balancing. The 
Panel itself tried to accommodate both views to some extent, but did not really resolve the issue. 
77 ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 126. 
78 This in turn contradicts the principle effectiveness (effet utile) according to which words are in a treaty for a 
meaning and must be given effect; see United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(US – Gasoline), Appellate Body Report (29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R), 21; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, Appellate Body Report (4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R), 96-106 and ICTSD & UNCTAD, 2005, 
118-119.  
79 See Section 3.2 above. It is worth noting that the Panel Report in Canada – Patents had been issued about a 
year before the Doha Declaration, and hence could not reflect the emphasis WTO Members placed on Article 7 
(and 8) therein.  
80 See the contributions in Kur & Mizaras, 2011. 
in the 19th and early 20th century as well as more recent experience of Asian countries such as 
Korea, India and China indicates that in order to facilitate technological development and 
economic welfare, IP policies must be tailored to the circumstances at hand and respond to 
domestic problems at stake.81 All this supports the need for TRIPS to allow for policy space on 
the domestic level – otherwise a central objective not only of TRIPS, but also of the WTO itself 
could not be properly implemented. 
 
Indeed, the sustainable development objective referenced in the WTO Preamble and its 
principle of integration82 that mediates between economic, social and environmental concerns 
equally imply policy space to search for the most appropriate balance on the domestic level.83 
Due to its ambiguous nature,84 the integration principle cannot operate as a norm which 
constrains state conduct in a way that prescribes one specific integrative outcome.85 Hence, 
states inevitably retain substantial discretion in giving effect to this principle as core element 
of a sustainable development objective.86 International adjudicators have to recognise this 
domestic policy space to balance economic, social and environmental concerns. They must 
exercise deference when assessing a disputed implementation of provisions originating from 
treaties with a sustainable development objective. In China – Rare Earths, the Panel agreed that 
construing WTO law so as to prevent a Member from taking measures necessary to protect the 
environment or human, animal or plant life or health is likely to be inconsistent with the 
sustainable development objective expressed in the WTO Preamble.87 This also supports the 
arguments made in the previous section for construing TRIPS rules in a way that the public 
interests principles in Article 8 are given effect. In essence, the balancing objectives of Article 
7 appear as an IP-specific expression of the sustainable development objective and its principle 
of integration. 
 
In sum, the notion of balancing interests within the IP system and the overarching aim of 
promoting socio-economic welfare in Article 7 imply policy space for implementing TRIPS 
that allows Members to tailor IP protection and enforcement to fit domestic needs. A tailored 
balancing of interests on the level of domestic implementation finally is not per se curtailed by 
arguments for legal certainty and legitimate expectations. The latter can be invoked only if such 
expectations derive from a WTO-conform interpretation, in particular one based on ordinary 
																																																						
81 Elmahjub, 2016, 31-36; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002, 18-20, and Kumar, 2002, as well 
as Khan, 2002.  
82 See GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary vs Slovakia, Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, 
7-84, para.140. See generally International Law Association (ILA), Declaration of Principles of International Law 
Related to Sustainable Development (New Delhi, 9 August 2002, Resolution 3/2002 – UN Doc. A/CONF.199/8) 
and Cordonier Segger & Khalfan, 2004, 96-171. 
83 See Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2010. 
84 Thomas Wälde notes that the beauty of the concept of sustainable development lies ‘in the fact that it is a 
“principle for all seasons’: ‘it neither imposes insufferable deprivation of consumption on the present nor 
disregards the needs of the future. It encompasses humanity, but also nature. It appears to solve irresolvable 
contradictions.  Everybody – from the liberal advocates of the global economy to fundamental environmentalists 
– can fill the concept with his/her meaning’ (emphasis added); see Wälde, 2004, 119. 
85 See Lowe, 1999, 23-24. 
86 Boyle & Freestone, 1999, 16.  
87 China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum (China – Rare Earths), 
Panel Report (WT/DS431/R, 26 March 2014) at para.7.111. 
meaning or context of a provision.88 These two interpretative factors then must be weighed 
against the TRIPS objectives in favour of a proportional system of IP protection that in principle 
has to be fine-tuned at the domestic level. Of course, the discretion to balance is limited and 
cannot amount to a re-writing of individual treaty provisions. These limits are drawn primarily 
by the parameters of treaty interpretation referred to in Article 3 (2) DSU. To the extent ordinary 
meaning and context allow for a range of possible meanings, it will be for the national law- and 
policy makers to interpret and implement TRIPS in a way that is ‘conducive to socio-economic 
welfare’ – as determined with regard to the specific domestic circumstances. 
 
Before section 4 discusses the role of both Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS for IP provisions in FTAs 
amongst WTO Members, the next section shows why this is important and what is at stake: As 
these FTAs tend to constrain flexibilities otherwise available under TRIPS, they have received 
criticism from several International Organizations, national parliaments, civil society 
organizations and academic writers. A common element in the critiques is the call for retaining 
core flexibilities under TRIPS, in particular those emphasised in the Doha Declaration. This in 
turn begs the question what role, if any, Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS can play in this regard. 
 
 
3.4 Collective Calls to Retain and Protect TRIPS Flexibilities 
 
As indicated in section 2, obligations in FTAs pertaining to the protection and enforcement of 
IP rights frequently go beyond the standards of the TRIPS Agreement (commonly referred to 
as ‘TRIPS-plus’). A general trend is for IP provisions in these agreements to become 
increasingly detailed and comprehensive – often simply aiming to ‘transplant’ the national IP 
laws of the demanding country into the legal system of the FTA partner(s).89 Such TRIPS-plus 
rules in FTAs are often subject to criticism.90 One central aspect of this critique is the fact that 
a lot of the TRIPS-plus standards are perceived as reducing or even eliminating the policy space 
and flexibilities TRIPS allows in the implementation of its obligations. As discussed section 
3.2, WTO Members unanimously recognized the importance of some of these flexibilities in 
the public health context in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. The raise of 
TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs then has led to increasing calls for recognizing and protecting 
a right of WTO Members to exercise their policy space, especially in the context of public 
health: On the international plane, the WHO emphasized that ‘Bilateral trade agreements should 
not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce access to medicines in 
																																																						
88 In India – Patents, the Appellate Body took a clear stand against infusing the concept of legitimate expectations 
into treaty interpretation – unless the ordinary of the TRIPS terms, in their context, support such expectations; see 
India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India – Patents), Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS50/AB/R (19 December 1997), para.32-41. 
89 See the discussion in section 2, and Correa et al, 2013, 878. 
90 See UN Economic and Social Council, ‘The Impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights on Human Rights – Report of the High Commissioner’, (27 June 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13), 
paras.27-28; United Nations – Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (31 March 2009, A/HRC/11/12) 
paras.68-93; and generally Drahos, 2003. 
developing countries.’91 Further, the Fifty-seventh World Health Assembly urges WHO 
Members 
as a matter of priority: (...) to take into account in bilateral trade agreements the 
flexibilities contained in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights and recognized by the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health adopted by the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference (Doha, 
2001).92 
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on right to health in his 2009 report explains 
‘[f]lexibilities were included in TRIPS to allow States to take into consideration their economic 
and development needs. States need to take steps to facilitate the use of TRIPS flexibilities.’93 
Because of this essential role of policy space within TRIPS, the Special Rapporteur demands 
that 
‘[de]veloping countries and LDCs should not introduce TRIPS-plus standards in their 
national laws. Developed countries should not encourage developing countries and 
LDCs to enter into TRIPS-plus FTAs and should be mindful of actions which may 
infringe upon the right to health.’94 
  
More recently, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution where UN member states 
reaffirm  
‘the right to use, to the fullest extent, the provisions contained in the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement), the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
(…) which provide flexibilities for the protection of public health, and in particular to 
promote access to medicines for all’95 
Finally, the September 2016 Report prepared by a High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, 
convened by the UN Secretary-General, notes ‘instances where undue political and economic 
pressure have been used to dissuade governments from using [TRIPS] flexibilities’ and states 
that such pressure ‘violates the integrity and legitimacy of the system of legal rights and duties 
created by TRIPS’.96 It then points to WTO Members ‘inalienable duty to protect health’, and 
in this context demands that ‘WTO Members must help safeguard the legitimate rights of 
individual Members to adopt and implement flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement as reaffirmed 
by the Doha Declaration.’ 
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2004, Resolution WHA57.14, Fifty-seventh World Health Assembly), 
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93 United Nations - Human Rights Council (2009), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
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94 Ibid, para.108. 
95 UN General Assembly ‘Global health and foreign policy: health employment and economic growth’, Resolution 
A/71/L.41 (8 December 2016), 5. 
96  High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, 14 
September 2016 (United Nations, Geneva / New York, 2016), 26. 
These statements are indicative for the concerns of the international community about not 
utilising the policy space TRIPS provides, and in particular with TRIPS-plus protections in 
FTAs that take away this space. References to a ‘right to use’97 TRIPS flexibilities and the ‘duty 
to protect’98 them in order to ensure that public health and other public interests are properly 
protected point not only to individual entitlements of WTO Members, but also to the utilitarian 
importance of retaining policy space for domestic IP regulation. The fact that international 
organisations such as the UN and the WHO frequently utter these concerns suggests a collective 
interest in retaining TRIPS flexibilities that perhaps even goes beyond any individual rights or 
duties. Finally, some WTO Members have taken steps, via specific ‘TRIPS flexibility safeguard 
clauses’ in FTAs, to ensure that TRIPS rights and obligations in general, or specific TRIPS 
flexibilities, remain applicable and relevant in the context of their FTAs.99 
 
All this begs the question whether those who signed and ratified such FTAs have foregone their 
‘right to use’ TRIPS flexibilities – or whether there are limits to the inter-se modifications that 
these FTAs represent vis-à-vis the IP provisions (including flexibilities) in TRIPS. In particular, 
such limits could result from a common interest all WTO Members have as a collective whole 
in retaining policy space in regulating IP. The next section reviews this issue in light of the core 
role Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS play as globally accepted objectives and principles whose 
interpretative function affects all flexibilities in TRIPS.  
 
 
4. Limits on Modifying TRIPS Inter-Se  
 
When considering whether there are any limits on the ability of WTO Members to negotiate 
away the flexibilities TRIPS provides, the obvious starting point in section 4.1 is to scrutinise 
TRIPS for any specific conflict clauses that might address this issue. Concluding that the only 
candidate within TRIPS does in fact not cover the question at issue here, the focus in section 
4.2 then shifts to general and customary international law principles that govern the question of 
modifying treaty rules inter-se. Based on the role of Articles 7 and 8 developed in section 3, the 
main argument here is that these provisions are of integral character so that derogations from 
TRIPS flexibilities that are essential for the effective execution of the object and purpose 
embodied in Articles 7 and 8 will not bind WTO Members to implement IP obligations which 
prevent them from tailoring IP protections to domestic needs. Rather, they have a right to (re-) 
establish their own domestic version of a utilitarian balance the objectives and principles of 
TRIPS broadly call for. 
 
One should add that the issue at stake here is often discussed, on a more general level, in the 
broader context of fragmentation (or norm overlap and conflict) in international law.100 In that 
																																																						
97 UN General Assembly, Resolution A/71/L.41 (2016), 5. 
98 High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, 2016, 26. 
99 For a comprehensive discussion see Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2011b. While some of these clause go some way to 
ensure the continued application or at least interpretative relevance of TRIPS flexibilities for IP provisions in 
FTAs, most make also sure that specific IP obligations of the FTA will prevail. Such clauses, even if they were 
widely adopted, therefore do not serve as an encompassing solution tot he problem posed here. 
100 See for example International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (Report of the Study Group of the International 
context, a commonly agreed methodology would first search, usually via concepts such as 
systemic integration, for an harmonious interpretation in relation to different norms of 
international law, binding upon the same states.101 Only in case the relation between two or 
more rules cannot be appropriately addressed by means of interpretation, one would turn to 
principles and rules for resolving norm conflicts, such as the idea of lex specialis or lex 
posterior.102 For the specific question at issue here, this however is not a sensible and relevant 
order of analysis: questions about the extent to which parties to a treaty are entitled to modify 
their rights and obligations under the treaty amongst some of the parties only, in particular by 
entering into so called inter-se agreements, are necessarily an incidental, preliminary issue. 
They need to be addressed before one enters into a discussion whether the norms from such an 
inter-se agreement can be interpreted harmoniously with those of the other agreement – and if 
not, whether which set of norms prevails in case of a conflict. For this reason, the analysis in 
this section does not address the extent to which IP provisions in FTAs and those in TRIPS can 
be interpreted harmoniously; nor does it deal with any conflict norms derived from TRIPS, 
FTAs, or general international law about which set of norms prevails in a case of a conflict (and 
indeed, what in fact constitutes a conflict in this context).103 
 
 
4.1 More Extensive IP Protection under Article 1 (1) TRIPS 
 
The TRIPS Agreement does not contain an explicit conflict rule which governs its relationship 
with subsequent agreements: There is no counterpart to Article 2 (2) TRIPS which is limited to 
the main multilateral IP treaties prior to TRIPS. There however is a provision that in substance 
is similar to the conflict rules for example in Articles 19 PC, 20 BC which define the relation 
between the Paris- and Berne Convention vis-à-vis later ‘special agreements’ amongst the 
Paris- or Berne Union countries.104 In the second sentence of Article 1 (1), TRIPS addresses 
the issue of additional protection beyond its own standards in the following terms: 
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not 
contravene the provisions of this Agreement. 
TRIPS hence generally authorizes Members to grant more extensive protection – with the 
qualification that such protection ‘does not contravene the provisions of the Agreement.’105  In 
the context addressed here, the main importance of this qualification lies in its capacity to 
																																																						
Law Commission, 13 April 2006, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682) – in the following: International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation Report (2006), Pauwelyn, 2003. 
101 See in particular Article 31 (3) c) VCLT – discussed extensively in the Fragmentation Report mentioned 
above, and in Mclachlan, 2005. 
102 See for example Article 30 VCLT on priority in application between subsequent treaties on the same subject 
matter – also discussed extensively in the Fragmentation Report (2006), and by Pauwelyn (2003). 
103 On these issues see Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2016, in particular Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
104 Essentially, these provisions make subsequent ‘special agreements’ on the subject matter covered by the PC 
and BC subject to being not contrary to the rules in the existing treaties. Article 20 BC (as well as corresponding 
provision in Article 22 of the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention) (Rome, 26 October 1961, 496 UNTS 43) adds that 
alternatively, such agreements must provide ‘more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention’ and 
thereby manifests a one-way street towards continuously increasing protections in core areas of international IP 
law, see generally Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2009. 
105 Art.1 (1) TRIPS (emphasis added). 
establish a condition on the ability to introduce more extensive IP protection: TRIPS-plus 
protection must not contravene TRIPS.106  
 
The principal question which arises here is whether this TRIPS provision can be understood as 
a rule governing the relations between TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs: Article 1 (1) 
TRIPS directly applies only to the ability of WTO Members to ‘implement in their law more 
extensive protection’.107 The distinction between an international agreement (such as a FTA) 
which requires ‘more extensive protection’ and introducing such protection in domestic law is 
a crucial one in IP law: Based on the uniformly accepted notion of territoriality of IP rights, the 
rights IP owners enjoy and the protection they provide in principle always results from national 
IP laws – international obligations to introduce ‘more extensive protection’ would always have 
to be first transposed into domestic IP laws.108 Hence, rules on additional IP protection in a 
FTA or other international agreement – even if these were found to ‘contravene’ TRIPS 
provisions – would arguably not breach Article 1 (1): A plain reading suggests that only the 
subsequent domestic implementation of TRIPS-plus FTA obligations can violate the non-
contravention standard in Article 1 (1). For the purpose of interpretation, the ordinary meaning 
of this provision thus suggests that the non-contravention standard in Article 1 (1) TRIPS does 
not function as a conflict rule concerning the relation between TRIPS and subsequent 
agreements on IP.  
 
Contextual and historical arguments provide support for this view: Article 19 PC – which is 
explicitly incorporated via the reference in Article 2 (1) TRIPS – contains the same non-
contravention standard, but refers to ‘special agreements for the protection of industrial 
property’. Negotiators must have surely been aware of this provision which they included 
amongst those with which WTO Members must comply. 109 If they had wished to give the same 
scope to Article 1 (1) TRIPS, one would expect them to use the same language. The fact that 
they did not militates strongly in favour of giving effect to the differences in the text of Article 
1 (1) of TRIPS: Its scope of operation thus concerns additional protection implemented in 
national laws – not mandated in international norms.  
 
The negotiation history of Art.1 (1) TRIPS further backs this conclusion. While the Brussels 
Draft of December 1990 is basically identical to the current text, the earlier W/76 Draft contains 
a more simple rule entitled ‘Freedom to Grant More Extensive Protection’ whereby ‘nothing in 
parts III-V of this agreement shall prevent PARTIES from granting more extensive protection 
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Ruse-Khan, 2009. 
107 Art.1 (1) 2nd sentence (emphasis added). 
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to intellectual property rights than that provided in this agreement.’110 This is in contrast to a 
rule in the same provision that obliges the parties not to derogate from existing obligations 
under GATT. Predecessors of Art.1 (1) TRIPS hence from the outset did not refer to 
international agreements granting additional IP protection – while they did so with regard to 
trade commitments under GATT. 
 
The general international law conflict rule on inter-se modifications amongst some of the parties 
to a treaty (such as TRIPS) equally supports these findings. Art.41 (1) (a) VCLT allows inter-
se agreements (such as FTAs amongst WTO Members)111 if ‘the possibility of modification is 
provided for by the treaty’. While such a possibility may be conditional, commentators demand 
for an express allowance to modify the treaty.112 This aligns with the general position that 
customary international law, as expressed in the main principles embodied in Article 41 VCLT, 
applies unless it is specifically contracted out.113 Even if one counters that Article 1 (1) 
implicitly allows states to act together in what this provision authorises them to do in their 
domestic IP systems,114 the no-contravention rule is, as will be further shown below, still of 
rather different character and addresses different scenarios than the customary principles 
embodied in Article 41 VCLT. As such, the TRIPS rule on additional protection in national law 
thus does not bar the application of Article 41 VCLT. Furthermore, equivalent provisions in 
other WTO Agreements which deal with the ability of WTO Members to enter into subsequent 
agreements that deviate from WTO law – such as Article XXIV GATT and Article V GATS 
on additional trade liberalisation – do so by explicitly referring to international treaties rather 
than domestic rules.115 
 
Also the main literature on the topic primarily understands Article 1 (1) 2nd sentence TRIPS as 
prohibiting additional, TRIPS-plus IP protection in national laws if it contravenes TRIPS 
provisions.116 In conclusion, if additional protection stems from an FTA or other international 
agreement, it is only the implementation of this protection – not the international treaty rule as 
such – which is captured by Article 1 (1) TRIPS. This of course still retains a relevant field of 
operation for this provision as WTO Members must ensure that such additional protection does 
not contravene TRIPS. However, as it has been argued elsewhere, this qualification does not 
function to protect (optional) TRIPS flexibilities against WTO Members who decide not to 
exercise them.117  
																																																						
110 See Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations - Chairman’s Report to the Group of Negotiation on Goods, Status 
of Work in the Negotiating Group, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, (23 July 1990, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76), 6. 
111 On the applicability of Article 41 in the TRIPS – FTA relations see section 4.2 below. 
112 Rigaux, Simon, Spanoudis, Weemaels, 2011, 995. 
113 From various ICJ cases where this was held, see in particular Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States 
of America v. Italy) I.C.J. Reports 1989, 42; see also International Law Commission, Fragmentation Report, 2006, 
para.185. See the next section for a brief discussion and further references showing that the relevant principles of 
Article 41 VCLT are indeed commonly considered as customary international law. 
114 I am indebted for Fernando Bordin for making this point in discussions on the scope of Article 1 (1). 
115 Article V GATS for example states that ‘[t]his Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a 
party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an 
agreement’ if certain conditions are met. 
116 See Stoll, Busche & Arend, 2009, 81-82; Gervais, 2012, 174. Also Mitchell and Voon conclude that TRIPS 
does not contain a rule on inter-se agreements; see Mitchell & Voon, 2009, 597. 
117 Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2016. 
 
In sum, because of its limited scope of application, Article 1 (1) TRIPS as such cannot be 
employed in order to safeguard the policy space Articles 7 and 8 provide. Therefore, the next 
step is to consider whether general international treaty law rules can be applied to address the 
issue of TRIPS-plus provisions limiting policy space provided under TRIPS. And even if one 
argues that TRIPS-plus FTAs are implicitly covered by Article 1 (1) TRIPS, there is no 
indication that WTO Members intended the non-contravention standard in this rule to 
exhaustively cover the relations between TRIPS and subsequent IP treaties between WTO 
Members. As the next section will show, the core customary law principles embodied in Article 
41 hence continue to apply in any case. 
 
 
4.2 Inter-se Modifications under Article 41 VCLT 
 
Article 41 VCLT addresses the question whether and under which conditions two or more of 
parties of a multilateral treaty may modify the treaty inter se. Since a FTA with provisions on 
(additional) IP protection concluded amongst two or more WTO Members generally amounts 
to ‘an agreement to modify the treaty [here TRIPS] as between themselves’, Article 41 can, in 
principle, be applied to govern the relation between TRIPS and IP provisions in FTAs between 
WTO Members.118 The main rationale behind Article 41 VCLT is to safeguard a multilateral 
treaty against modifications by some of its Members only – while at the same time preserving 
some freedom of states to enter into more specific contractual relations. This balance finds 
expression in the main criteria for allowing inter-se modifications under Art.41 VCLT: Unless 
explicitly addressed in the multilateral treaty, modifications are allowed to the extent that they 
do not affect (i) the rights and obligations of other parties to the multilateral treaty; and (ii) the 
object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. Applying these criteria depends a lot on the nature 
of the multilateral treaty: Does it establish separable obligations between individual contracting 
parties only or obligations owed to the community of parties as a whole? Before addressing 
these issues, a general question on the applicability of Article 41 VCLT for determining 
relations between WTO treaties and subsequent agreements amongst WTO Members arises. 
 
 
4.2.1 Applicability in the WTO Context 
 
Although Article 41 VCLT is not part of WTO law, the principles and rules it contains have the 
status of customary international law and hence generally apply as long as no specific conflict 
																																																						
118 Article 41 VCLT requires that two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty ‘conclude an agreement to 
modify the treaty as between themselves alone’ (emphasis added): It follows that only for FTAs where at least one 
of the contracting parties is not a WTO Member, the general international law rule on inter-se agreements does 
not apply; see Rigaux, Simon, Spanoudis, Weemaels, 2011, 987; International Law Commission, Fragmentation 
Report, 2006, 151-152. Hence, in cases where only one FTA contracting party is a WTO Member, the relation 
between TRIPS and any IP provisions in the FTA for this country is, absent any specific rules, determined by 
Art.30 (4) VCLT. 
norm within the WTO treaties exhaustively governs the matter at issue.119 On the specific 
question of the applicability of Article 41 VCLT in TRIPS – FTA relations, the WTO Appellate 
Body’s findings in Peru – Agricultural Products are decisive. In that dispute, Peru advanced 
various arguments why a prohibition in Article 4 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture (AA)120 
must be either interpreted in light of, or be superseded by, an FTA (allegedly allowing exactly 
what the AA prohibits) it signed with the complainant, Guatemala.121 Rejecting the idea that 
VCLT treaty interpretation can go as far as to completely turn around the (ordinary) meaning 
of a WTO rule, the Appellate Body then considered whether the FTA can be invoked as a valid 
modification of the AA rules.122 The Appellate Body was not convinced that the FTA 
modification should be judged against Article 41 VCLT on inter-se agreements.123 It 
note[s] that the WTO agreements contain specific provisions addressing amendments, 
waivers, or exceptions for regional trade agreements, which prevail over the general 
provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as Article 41. This is particularly true in the 
case of FTAs considering that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 specifically permits 
departures from certain WTO rules in FTAs.124 
The AB hence concluded that derogations from WTO obligations in FTAs must be judged 
against Article XXIV GATT and the Enabling Clause to the extent they concern trade in goods; 
while FTA derogations from commitments on services trade are tested against Article V 
GATS.125  
 
In giving priority to these ‘specific’ provisions in WTO Agreements over the general VCLT 
rules, the Appellate Body did two important things: (1) It effectively applied the lex specialis 
rule as a tool to determine priority in application between competing rules on treaty 
modifications, including rules outside WTO law, and thereby confirms the relevance of the lex 
specialis principle for WTO law.126 This in itself makes a case for applying general international 
law principles, in particular those on norm hierarchy and conflict resolution, in WTO dispute 
settlement. (2) The Appellate Body implicitly opened the door for the application of the more 
general law once no specific WTO rule exists that applies to the question at issue. This is 
particularly true when the general rule is part of customary international law: While not all 
contours of the debates about the role of non-WTO rules within WTO dispute settlement are 
settled, there is ‘little reason of principle to depart from the view that general international law 
supplements WTO law unless it has been specifically excluded’.127 An earlier WTO Panel 
																																																						
119 See Pauwelyn, 2003, 305, 315. In WTO dispute settlement, the Panel in Turkey – Textiles relied on Article 41 
(1) VCLT; see Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, Panel Report (31 May 1999, 
WT/DS34/R), para.9.181. 
120 Agreement on Agriculture (AA) (Marrakesh, 1 January 1995, 1867 UNTS 410). 
121 See Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products (Peru – Agricultural Products), 
Appellate Body Report (31 July 2015, WT/DS457/AB/R), para.5.91. 
122 Peru – Agricultural Products, para.5.97. 
123 Ibid, para.5.111. 
124 Ibid, para.5.112 (emphasis added). 
125 Ibid, para.5.113. 
126 For a list of cases where the lex specialis principle is applied to establish a hierarchy primarily amongst different 
WTO rules, see Cook, 2015, 86-90. 
127 International Law Commission, Fragmentation Report, para.169. The Report continues that ‘[e]ven as it is clear 
that the competence of WTO bodies is limited to consideration of claims under the covered agreements (and not, 
for example, under environmental or human rights treaties), when elucidating the content of the relevant rights 
Report also held that ‘[c]ustomary international law applies generally to the economic relations 
between WTO Members (…) to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not ‘contract 
out’ from it.’128 
 
In the TRIPS – TRIPS-plus FTA context, no rule akin to Article XXIV GATT or Article V 
GATS exists. The amendment or waiver provisions in TRIPS and the WTO Agreement do not 
apply, as they concern completely different situations. As shown above, Article 1 (1) TRIPS 
does not apply to inter-se modifications in form of FTAs – so that the door is open to resort to 
the general rule in Article 41 VCLT. This follows not only as argumentum a contrario from 
the lex specialis rule which the Appellate Body applied to reject Article 41 VCLT in cases 
where a more ‘specific’ WTO provision exists. Earlier WTO Panels have also shown their 
willingness to consider Article 41 VCLT.129 In Peru – Agricultural Products, the Appellate 
Body hence went beyond the application of the VCLT treaty interpretation rules WTO 
adjudicators are bound to apply by virtue of Article 3 (2) DSU: it shows that the WTO’s ‘clinical 
isolation’ from international law – here in form of Article 41 VCLT – does not begin where 
treaty interpretation ends. General or Customary international law, in particular its rules on 
priority of application and conflict resolution, does have a place in WTO jurisprudence. 
 
 
4.2.2 Operationalising the Principles in Article 41 VCLT 
 
Unless explicitly addressed in the multilateral treaty, Article 41 allows an inter se modification 
to the extent that it 
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or 
the performance of their obligations; 
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 
If either of these requirements is not met, the relevant inter-se modification constitutes a breach 
of the multilateral treaty (here TRIPS) and hence cannot be enforced to the extent of its 
inconsistency.130 While it is rather straightforward to conclude that TRIPS does not provide for 
an (express) ‘possibility of modification’ in the sense of Article 41 (1) (a) and that it does not 
prohibit inter-se modifications,131 applying the rules in Article 41 (1) (b) VCLT to IP provisions 
in FTAs is not. In general terms, TRIPS-plus FTAs as inter-se modifications of TRIPS 
(1) may not affect the enjoyment of TRIPS rights or obligations by other (non-FTA) WTO 
Members;  
(2) nor may they modify provisions crucial for the effective execution of TRIPS’ object and 
purpose.  
																																																						
and obligations, WTO bodies must situate those rights and obligations within the overall context of general 
international law’; ibid, para.170. 
128 Korea – Government Procurement, (19 January 2000) WT/DS163/R, para. 7.96. 
129 Cook, 2015, 93-95. 
130 International Law Commission, Fragmentation Report, 2006, 164; for a detailed analysis of the legal 
consequences of breach, see Pauwelyn, 2003, 310-315. 
131 The conditional allowance of more extensive protection under Article 1 (1) TRIPS does not amount to such a 
prohibition since (1) it allows such protection unless it contravenes TRIPS provisions; and (2) further deals with 
domestic implementation of such protection. 
The principal question hence is how these two requirements – which cumulatively must be 
fulfilled in order for IP provisions in FTAs to be allowed as inter-se modifications of TRIPS – 
can be put into operation in the TRIPS – FTA context. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Affecting rights or obligations of other WTO Members 
 
The first requirement expresses the relative effect of the inter-se agreement which must not 
prejudice the rights of third parties to the multilateral treaty nor add to their obligations (pacta 
tertiis principle).132 The question here is whether IP provisions in FTAs amongst WTO 
Members can affect the rights and obligations other WTO Members enjoy under TRIPS. This 
certainly would be the case if the FTA mandates to lower IP protection for right holders of other 
WTO Members below the minimum standards contained in TRIPS – for example by limiting 
patent protection to 10 years contrary to Art.33 TRIPS. If however the inter-se modification 
does not implicate protections of right holders from WTO Members other than the FTA parties, 
the rights of other WTO Members arguably are not affected: Art.1 (3) TRIPS requires that 
‘[WTO] Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nationals of 
other Members.’ Hence, lowering patent protection to ten years only for one’s own nationals 
only does not concern TRIPS at all.133  Extending this lower standard to the nationals of an FTA 
partner with the express consent of that country in the FTA does not touch on the rights of other 
WTO Members as long as their own nationals remain unaffected.134  
  
In the typical situation where the FTA extends rather than constrains the minimum standards 
of TRIPS, it is not easy to conceive a case where third party rights or obligations are affected: 
Based on the territoriality of IP rights, TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs and their implementation 
generally affect the domestic IP regimes of the FTA contracting parties only. Under the 
obligations to provide most favourite nation (MFN) and national treatment, the right holders of 
other WTO Members would normally benefit from this additional protection.135 In this light, 
additional IP protection or enforcement agreed inter-se will in principle not add any obligations 
for other WTO Members; but rather expands their ‘right’ (under MFN) to demand something 
beyond the minimum standards of protection. 
 
However, there may be cases where TRIPS-plus protection or enforcement does have a negative 
impact on other WTO Members: Countries relying on imports of generics or drugs produced 
under a compulsory licence (for example under the so called ‘paragraph six mechanism’)136 
																																																						
132 Rigaux, Simon, Spanoudis, Weemaels, 2011, 1002. 
133 EC – GIs, para.7.148; see also Stoll, Busche & Arend, 2009, 87, Correa, 2007, 60-61; Hestermeyer, 2007, 198 
who all emphasize that TRIPS does not cover the domestic relationship between a Member and its own nationals. 
134 A practical example is Article 224 of the EC – CARIFORUM EPA that introduces a general exception clause 
which arguably allows for IP-related exceptions beyond the flexibility the so called ‘three-step-test’ in 
international IP law provides.  
135 See Article 4 d) TRIPS: distinct to Article XXIV GATT and Article V GATS, TRIPS does not contain an 
exception from MFN (and national treatment) obligations which would limit additional commitments made in a 
post-TRIPS FTA to right holders from the FTA partner. 
136 WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6 December 2005 (Hong Kong, 8 
December 2005, WT/L/641). The ‘paragraph six mechanism’, so called due to its original mandate in para.6 of 
abroad in order to provide their own population with affordable medicines may certainly be 
affected by TRIPS-plus inter-se modifications if those limit the ability of the manufacturing 
country to produce and export medicines. Patent term extensions for pharmaceuticals, limits on 
the grounds for granting compulsory licenses or test data exclusivity periods may disturb access 
to medicines in all countries relying on the FTA partner agreeing to such TRIPS-plus standards. 
Similarly, the availability of (affordable) copyright protected material modified for the needs 
of visually impaired persons (VIPs), such as books in braille, may depend on the existence of 
exceptions and limitations which allow such modification in the country of origin from where 
this material then may be exported to countries in need.137 Again, a FTA which would affect 
such exceptions and limitations to produce and export material for VIPs – for example via an 
exhaustive list of exceptions not including one for VIPs – has an impact beyond the territory of 
the FTA parties. The same applies for example when the EU includes lists of GIs in FTAs with 
its trading partners: In those countries, such additional GI protection often will prevent US 
competitors from continuing to market their dairy products with names similar or identical to 
GIs (Feta, Gorgonzola or similar) which become exclusive to EU producers by virtue of the 
FTA.138  
 
In general, the availability of all goods or services that rely on exceptions and limitations to 
IPRs in order to be produced, traded and sold may be affected by FTA protections that 
undermine reliance on such exceptions or limitations.139 Similarly, for companies providing 
online services that rely on the existence of flexible exceptions and limitations, the ubiquitous 
nature of the internet can lead to similar results: fewer or more limited exceptions mandated by 
an FTA in a key domestic market may not only affect the availability of e.g. search services 
(for images, excerpts of books, etc) in the country introducing such exceptions, but also all 
other countries unless the service provider is able and willing to target and fine-tune its service 
in order to cater for different national exception regimes. While this is technologically possible, 
it may not be economically feasible and may even lead to services being offered globally in 
accordance with the laws of the most restrictive copyright regime operating in a major market. 
In sum, international trade, the ubiquitous nature of the internet, global supply chains and 
dependency on imports of goods affected by IP protection create a scenario where additional 
IP protection agreed in an FTA certainly can have an impact for other WTO Members. 
 
The main question then is whether there is a right under TRIPS that other (the non-FTA) WTO 
Members can invoke if they are affected by such additional standards agreed in an FTA? While 
there certainly is a ‘right’ to demand adherence to the minimum standards set out in TRIPS, is 
there a right to a balanced IP system which takes access to- and dissemination of IP protected 
material sufficiently into account? Does for example India owe it to African WTO Members to 
retain all possible TRIPS flexibilities in order to ensure the greatest possible access to 
affordable medicines in these countries? Does TRIPS provide for a right that other WTO 
																																																						
the Doha Declaration (n 7), which this General Council decision implements allows exports of medicines produced 
under a compulsory license into countries with insufficient manufacturing capacities. 
137 See the Marrakesh Treaty, introducing mandatory minimum exceptions and limitations for VIPs. 
138 See the discussion in Part Four, Chapter 1, Section III. 
139 For a detailed analysis on the impact of TRIPS-plus protection on the free movement of information, knowledge 
and associated goods or services see Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2009, 92-99. 
Members utilise all or some of the access and dissemination related flexibilities in the 
Agreement? In this regard, Article 7 TRIPS states that IP protection and enforcement ‘should’ 
be balanced, and promote socio-economic welfare. As shown in section 3, WTO Members in 
TRIPS express a normative preference, a common goal and expectation, but no hard legal 
obligation that domestic IP regimes are balancing protection and access. Furthermore, Article 
8 (1) TRIPS, as well as other provisions such as Artt.13, 15 (3), 17, 26 (2), 27 (2)&(3), 30 and 
31 TRIPS, allow rather than require WTO Members to adopt measures promoting access and 
use of IP protected goods or services. Based on the text of the treaty, TRIPS therefore does not 
establish an obligation for WTO Members to utilise access- and use related flexibilities. It hence 
also does not create a right of other WTO Members to demand such utilisation – even if this 
has an impact on access and use in their own territory. 
 
It follows that WTO Members have no right to demand from other Members the full use and 
implementation of optional provisions in TRIPS that may be limited via a TRIPS-plus FTA. 
However, they do have a right to use these flexibilities themselves in their own IP system. The 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health makes this explicit in paragraph 4 by reaffirming 
‘the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which 
provide flexibility for this [public health] purpose.’ Section 3.4 has pointed to a range of 
subsequent statements by international organizations and the community of states which have 
reiterated this. Based on the general approach within WTO law, including TRIPS, to cover both 
de facto as well as de jure interferences,140 inhibiting the effective ability to exercise a TRIPS 
flexibility would be sufficient to establish that an inter-se modification ‘affect[s] the enjoyment 
by the other parties of their rights under the treaty’. This right to use TRIPS flexibilities 
domestically can be undermined by TRIPS-plus rules in an FTA: The case of generic drugs 
from India seized in transit in the EU on their way to Brazil141 offers a good example how 
border measures which go beyond the minimum standards of TRIPS can affect the ability of 
other countries to use TRIPS flexibilities at home: to the extent drugs are seized in transit, any 
potential country of final destination would be effectively barred from relying on international 
exhaustion or a compulsory licence to import these drugs. Any FTA amongst WTO Members 
which mandates such transit seizures then undermines the enjoyment of TRIPS rights by WTO 
Members who intended to import the seized goods. 
 
In more general terms, any form of IP protection and enforcement with extra-territorial effect 
(such as transit seizures or measures applied to services provided over the internet) may 
interfere with the ability of other WTO Members to exercise flexibilities as rights under TRIPS 
in their own law. If such measures are mandated by a FTA, they may be in conflict with the 
pacta tertiis principle embedded in Article 41 VCLT. One can thus conclude that where a 
TRIPS-plus inter-se treaty inhibits the ability of other WTO Members to exercise their rights 
under TRIPS, i.e. to use the TRIPS flexibilities effectively, then such a modification is 
inconsistent with Art.41:1(b) (i) VCLT. 
 
																																																						
140 For de facto discrimination under the national treatment obligation see EC – GIs, paras.7.131-7.140; for the 
general non-discrimination test on patent protection see Canada – Patents, paras.7.100-101. 
141 See generally Jaeger & Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2009. 
 
4.2.2.2 Undermining the effective operation of TRIPS’ object and purpose: the nature of 
TRIPS obligations 
 
Under the second requirement in Article 41, an inter-se modification may not relate to a 
provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole (Art.41 (1) (b) (ii) VCLT). In line with Article 18 VCLT that 
prohibit acts defeating the treaty’s object and purpose after signature but prior to ratification 
and Article 19 that disallows reservations incompatible with object and purpose, the provision 
highlights the importance of the treaty’s objectives. In the words of the ICJ 
‘It is also a generally recognised principle that a multilateral convention is the result of 
an agreement freely concluded upon its clauses and that consequently none of the 
contracting parties is entitled to frustrate or impair, by means of unilateral decisions or 
particular agreements, the purpose and raison d’etre of the convention.’142 
Akin to the case of inter-se interferences with the rights and obligations of other parties, this 
rule builds on the distinction between reciprocal (or synallagmatic) and integral (or 
interdependent) treaties – a distinction generally recognised in international law.143 In a 
nutshell, multilateral treaties which can be broken down into detachable, bilateral obligations 
owed between the contracting parties individually and reciprocally belong to the former 
category of reciprocal treaties. The need for compatibility with the object and purpose of the 
treaty will here rarely be an obstacle to the conclusion of inter-se agreements.144  
 
On the other hand, integral or interdependent treaties are, inter alia, those relating to a common 
interest of all parties over and above the sum of their individual interests – where the 
performance of obligations is owed to all parties as a whole (inter omnes partes).145 Examples 
are treaties concerning human rights, human development, world heritage and environmental 
protection.146 Here, an inter-se modification ‘constitutes a derogation to the treaty itself and 
affects all the parties’ so that it will much more likely be ‘incompatible with the realisation of 
the object and purpose of the treaty’.147 In other words, the purpose of such ‘treaties of 
legislative or administrative character (…) where the utility and effectiveness depends upon 
uniform application by all parties’ will normally be defeated by inter-se deviations.148 The 
origin and rationale for the prohibition in Article 41 VCLT to deviate from provisions essential 
																																																						
142 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion 
of 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, at 21. 
143 See Article 48 (1) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), which distinguishes between 
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144 Rigaux, Simon, Spanoudis, Weemaels, 2011, 1003-1004. 
145 James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on State Responsibility (10 March 2000, UN Doc. 
A/CN/.4/507), para.92. 
146 Pauwelyn, 2003, 62; Hestermeyer, 2007, 188-190. 
147 Rigaux, Simon, Spanoudis, Weemaels, 2011, 1004. 
148 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Faculty of 
the Harvard Law School, 29(4) (1935) American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 1018. 
for the object and purpose of a multilateral treaty hence is its integral character – the pursuit 
of common interests or values or the establishment of objective regimes or constitutional 
structures.149 
 
Is the TRIPS Agreement, as a specific part of the WTO Agreements, such an integral or 
interdependent treaty or merely reciprocal in nature? Pauwelyn has argued extensively that the 
nature of WTO obligations in principle is reciprocal rather than integral – primarily because 
they constitute a promise to each and every WTO Member individually rather than to the 
collective whole.150  He however concedes that this applies primarily to trade liberalisation 
commitments – while IP protection rules under TRIPS, as a form of positive integration, can be 
viewed as integral because they pursue a common interests (such as the promotion of 
innovation, technological advancement and transfer of technology).151 These common interests 
– which, according to Article 7 TRIPS, the protection and enforcement of IP should promote – 
hence warrant a closer look at TRIPS as a treaty that may go beyond the mere reciprocal 
exchange of commitments between the individual WTO Members. 
 
One argument to consider TRIPS along with most other international agreements on the 
protection of IP as merely reciprocal relates to the limited beneficiaries of the protection these 
treaties confer: IP treaties are – and always have been from their inception – primarily 
concerned with the protection of foreign right holders from contracting states. For example, the 
non-discrimination principles as well as minimum standards in the Berne and Paris Convention 
generally oblige states only vis-à-vis IP owned by foreign right holders, not with regard to 
purely ‘domestic cases’.152 This reveals the inherently reciprocal nature of the commitments to 
protect IP: A state owes it individually and reciprocally to each of the other contracting states 
to protect the works, inventions and trademarks of their respective right holders. If there was a 
common, erga omnes partes interest to protect IP – as there is for example a common interest 
to protect human rights – this interest would demand that all authors and inventors, including 
(if not primarily) domestic residents and a Member’s own nationals, are protected under the 
conventions. 
 
TRIPS takes the same approach in Art.1 (3) by obliging WTO Members only to protect ‘the 
nationals of other Members’. With regard to the standards of IP protection, it does not move 
away from the inherently reciprocal nature of international IP obligations. In other aspects 
however, TRIPS goes beyond serving the bundle of national interests of individual WTO 
Members to have their right holders protected abroad. These ‘integral’ aspects concern the 
objectives of IP protection and enforcement: For the first time in international IP law, the 
contracting parties in the TRIPS Agreement have constituted the common societal goals IP 
protection should achieve. The primary textual expression of this shift is Article 7 TRIPS, 
whereby the ‘Objectives’ of TRIPS are that IP protection and enforcement  
																																																						
149 See International Law Commission, Fragmentation Report, 160-161. Pauwelyn, 2003, 308-309 shows in detail 
how the early case-law of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and ICJ, such as the Oscar Chin and 
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150 Pauwelyn, 2003, 69-78. See also Hestermeyer, 2007, 197-199. 
151 Pauwelyn, 2003, 71. 
152 Article 5 (3) BC makes this explicit by stating: ‘Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic 
law.’ 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Although not drafted as a hard legal obligation, Article 7 sets out the common objectives IP 
protection under TRIPS should aim at: promoting innovation, in balance with the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, overall striving for social and economic welfare. As elaborated in 
detail in section 3, this is not just hortatory or declaratory language: In the Doha Declaration, 
all WTO Members confirmed that this provision, together with Article 8 concerning the 
protection of public interests outside the IP balance, is the primary expression of the object and 
purpose of TRIPS and therefore shall guide the interpretation and implementation of all other 
TRIPS provisions.153  
 
This function of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS in setting out the common, collective goals of IP 
protection hence informs the proper construction of each of TRIPS’ rules and thereby finds 
expression in the individual TRIPS provisions. In this way, it also determines the ability of 
WTO Members to deviate from these obligations inter-se. FTA rules which nullify TRIPS 
provisions embodying the common goals set out in Articles 7 and 8 are prohibited under Art.41 
(1) (b) (ii) VCLT – as they ‘relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with 
the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole’.154 This general 
finding however does not lead very far: What are these essential elements of a ‘constitutional’ 
international IP system that serves the common goals of promoting innovation while providing 
access to intellectual goods in a balance, as well as to promote public interests? Which, if any, 
TRIPS provisions represent either the balancing objectives or the public interest principles in a 
way that WTO Members may not modify them inter-se in an FTA?  
 
An answer depends a lot on the individual circumstances of modifying TRIPS rules via an inter-
se agreement and would generally cover deviations from both minimum protection standards 
as well as limits to IP protection. For the typical inter-se modification in form of TRIPS-plus 
rules in a FTA, the TRIPS – as well as incorporated Paris- and Berne Convention – rules on 
subject matter exclusions (such as Art.9 (2) and 27 (2)&(3) TRIPS and 2 (8) BC), limits on the 
scope of protection (as in Artt.13, 17, 27 (1), 30, 31, 33, 39 (3) TRIPS as well as 7, 10 BC) and 
those dealing with the abuse of IPRs (as in Artt.8 (2), 40 TRIPS and 5A PC) incorporate 
essential elements deviation from which may often undermine the common goals set out in 
Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS. Taking the policy space afforded under these provisions away without 
compensatory measures will make it significantly more difficult for WTO Members to (1) 
achieve a balanced IP system where Members are still able to tailor IP protection and 
enforcement to suit its own domestic needs; (2) retain the ability to protect public interests such 
as public health. A detailed analysis depends on the individual TRIPS-plus provision at stake 
																																																						
153 See para.5 a) of the Doha Declaration. 
154 Mitchell & Voon, 2009, 598 adopt a similar approach when they refer to public health related flexibilities as 
reflecting ‘the delicate balance agreed among WTO Members’ which groups of Members may not tie their hands 
to determine or restrict via an FTA. The negotiation history of Articles 7 and 8 confirms the importance of these 
provisions as part of the overall ‘TRIPS package’; see Part Five, Chapter 1, Section III. Hestermeyer, 2007, 198 
comes to a similar conclusion as to the integral nature of TRIPS – but bases this primarily on the intention of 
negotiating States to establish an internationally harmonized system of protection. 
and hence is beyond the scope of this section. However, Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss have set out 
a useful framework of an ‘international intellectual property acquis’155 which can well serve as 
a starting point for examining whether a specific TRIPS-plus FTA provision interferes with a 
multilateral IP norm in way that undermines the object and purpose of TRIPS: One-sided 
derogations from the acquis that are not compensated by alternative allowances to achieve a 
tailored balance or to protect public interests are inherently problematic. 
 
As already highlighted in section 3: the balance of promoting innovation and access set out as 
the common objective of IP protection and enforcement in Article 7 TRIPS is rather loosely 
framed. It hence leaves significant discretion for fine-tuning on the domestic level, in 
accordance with domestic needs. The same applies for measures public interest measures under 
Article 8: Individual WTO Members are best placed to determine which measures are 
‘necessary (…) to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development’. As TRIPS-specific recognition of the right to 
regulate, also the principles expressed in Article 8 imply discretion on the side of WTO 
Members. Section 3 has shown how individual TRIPS provisions, interpreted and implemented 
in light of these objectives and principles, equally leave policy space.  This implies that most 
inter-se deviations from individual TRIPS provisions as such will not necessarily touch the 
boundaries of the loose multilateral frame set by Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS: As long as the FTA 
states are still able to achieve a balance they find ‘conducive to social and economic welfare’ 
for their domestic IP systems and are able to take measures that protect public interests ‘in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development’, inter-se 
modifications in FTAs will not undermine the goals of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS. They will then 
not amount to a derogation ‘incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a whole’ prohibited under Article 41 VCLT. 
 
This leaves us with a rather open conclusion on the application of the requirement in Article 41 
(1) (b) (ii) VCLT: As a multilateral agreement, TRIPS – and the Paris- and Berne provisions it 
incorporates – establish an integral framework that is founded on the common goals WTO 
Members have expressed in Article 7 TRIPS and confirmed in the Doha Declaration. It is also 
based on the ability to take public interest measures under Article 8, which are equally (if not 
more) at the heart of the confirmations in paragraph 4 and 5 of Doha. Based on the international 
law safeguards against inter-se modification of these collective interests of all WTO Members, 
there are limits to what can be agreed in FTAs: FTA parties must ensure that the IP standards 
they negotiate do not affect core TRIPS flexibilities derogation from which is incompatible 
with the effective operation of the object and purpose of TRIPS embodied in its Articles 7 and 
8. Hence, flexibilities crucial for the balance which Article 7 establishes, and those crucial to 
protect public interests under Article 8, must remain untouched. These are flexibilities which 
are essential for creating a domestic IP system ‘conducive to social and economic welfare’ – 
and for adopting measures necessary to protect public interests ‘in sectors of vital importance 
to [domestic] socio-economic and technological development’. FTA IP provisions therefore 
must leave sufficient policy space for this purpose and, based on Article 31 (3) c) VCLT, should 
be construed in this sense to the extent possible. In cases of specific FTA provisions adding to 
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the protection of right holders’ interests, this will often imply a right of the FTA implementing 
country to draft exceptions and limitations or other compensatory measures necessary for 
restoring the balance of Article 7 TRIPS, or to give effect to public interests under Article 8.156 
As soon as these measures are essential for giving effect to TRIPS’ object and purpose, the right 
to adopt them prevails over FTA provisions which cannot be interpreted so as to allow re-
balancing under Article 7, and protecting public interests along Article 8. Based on WTO- and 
general international law, there would hence be no obligation to implement IP protections 
which cannot be interpreted to allow the policy space described above.  
 
In most instances however, no disregard for a specific TRIPS-plus obligation in a FTA will be 
required. Usually, adopting measures not explicitly denied or even addressed in the FTA will 
suffice to re-balance or to protect public interests. In order to illustrate the operation of Articles 
7 and 8 as loose constitutional frames of an international IP system anchored in TRIPS, three 
examples for ‘problematic’ TRIPS-plus provisions, given in the Report of the UN High-Level 
Panel on Access to Medicines,157 will be discussed here:  (1) A prohibition to foresee pre-grant 
patent opposition proceedings158 can be highly problematic from an access to medicines 
perspective, and significantly limit the ability of third parties to ensure that the patent granting 
process is properly implementing limits to subject matter as well as the domestic thresholds of 
novelty, inventive step, and utility (which are commonly applied levers for tailoring patent 
protection to domestic needs). Countries facing the implementation of such prohibitions would 
be able to rely on Articles 7 and 8 and ‘re-balance’ their domestic IP system by making post-
grant opposition and challenges to patent validity in court proceedings easy, for example by 
doing away with any presumption of validity. 
 
(2) Obligations to introduce ‘patent linkage’ where drug regulatory authorities cannot approve 
a generic version of a patent-protected medicine without the patent owner’s consent also 
significantly curtail the policy space to protect public health and to balance incentives to 
innovate with access considerations. In order to give effect to Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, countries 
facing such linkage provisions in FTAs159 could consider introducing options for easy and fast 
challenges to the validity of the patent ‘linked’ to generic marketing approval, ideally within 
the process requesting such approval. They could also carry forward exceptions and especially 
compulsory licensing from patent law into regulatory approval, so that the producer of generics 
can obtain marketing approval at least as soon as he has obtained a compulsory licence to make 
and sell the respective patented product. Unless the measures suggested in (1) and (2) are 
explicitly prohibited in the relevant FTA, adopting them would not even involve disregarding 
specific treaty obligations in the inter-se agreement.  
 
The next example however shows that sometimes, TRIPS-plus rules in FTAs can deny core 
flexibilities essential to ensure that TRIPS does not prevent WTO Members from protecting 
public health. (3) Limits in FTAs on the grounds for issuing a compulsory licence (for example 
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157 High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines, 2016, 25-26. 
158 Article 16.7(4) US-Singapore FTA; Article 18.8.4 US-Korea FTA. 
159 Article 19(5)(3) CAFTA-DR; Article 17(9)(4) US–Chile FTA; Article 15(9)(6) US–Morocco  FTA; Article 
16(7)(5) US–Singapore FTA; Article 14(8)(5) US–Bahrain FTA. 
to national emergencies or tackling anti-competitive practices)160 directly clash with one of the 
core flexibilities highlighted in paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration. Based on Articles 7 and 
8, WTO Members would have, as a minimum, the right to introduce ‘government use’ licenses 
(including for entities authorised by the government) or judicial compulsory licences under 
Article 44 (2) TRIPS that cover all grounds necessary for a tailored balance and/or the 
protection of public interests. Alternatively, Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS could be employed as 
interpretative tools under Article 31 (3) c) VCLT to support a far-reaching reading of ‘national 
emergency’ or other ground allowed for compulsory licensing under the FTA. Should those 
compensatory measure not be sufficient or suitable for the domestic IP system, as a last resort, 
the FTA contracting state has a right to disregard the FTA obligation which limits the grounds 
for issuing a compulsory licence. 
 
In summary then, section 4 has shown that Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, as common object and 
purpose of the main multilateral treaty on IP protection, do have a role to play in safeguarding 
TRIPS flexibilities. Where WTO members agree to TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs the 
implementation of which eventually prevents achieving the TRIPS balancing objectives and 
giving effect to public interest principles, those WTO members have a right to ‘re-balance’ their 
domestic IP system and to introduce public interest measures which are vital to their socio-
economic development. Usually, this will not require disregarding specific IP provisions in 
FTAs. If the latter however continue to become ever more detailed and comprehensive, the 
chances increase that at some point in the future, their implementation will derogate from the 
common object and purpose of TRIPS to an extent that WTO Members who have signed up to 
them need to go back to the drafting table. As a last resort, they enjoy a right to give preference 
to the multilaterally agreed Objectives and Principles in TRIPS. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Arguing for a more Resilient Multilateral IP Framework  
 
Since its inception, the international IP system has continuously transformed itself. After a 
revolution in the late 19th century where the Paris and Berne Convention as first multilateral 
treaties superseded a patchwork of a few bilateral or regional agreements, the dynamics 
changed. In most of the 20th century, we have seen a much more evolutionary development – 
characterised by continuous increasing minimum standards via revisions of the main 
multilateral treaties, and by expanding their territorial reach to most newly independent states 
in a post-colonial world. This development – safeguarded by inbuilt mechanisms against 
erosion of protection161 – had set a dynamic agenda towards more IP protection and 
enforcement within the multilateral system. 
 
From the 1960ies on, increasing opposition by developing countries however prevented further 
harmonisation upwards; and pushed for more policy space for facilitating technology transfer 
																																																						
160 Article 4(20) US-Jordan FTA; Article 16(7)(6) US-Singapore  FTA; and Article 17(9)(7) US-Australia FTA. 
161 See the Paris- and Berne Convention rules that govern the applicability of subsequent revisions (Articles 20-27 
PC and 27-32 BC); and particularly in those rules limiting the ability of the contracting parties to enter into ‘special 
agreements’ (Articles 19 PC and 20 BC) which aim to ensure that international IP protection can only increase, 
not decrease. 
and access to essential, IP-protected goods, especially in the context of the New International 
Economic Order movement.162 In order to counter these attempts to weaken the system and to 
move IP protection and enforcement forward again, a new revolution was necessary. This came 
in form of shifting multilateral rule-making to the trade forum where IP was only one of several 
concessions countries were willing to exchange. The resulting WTO/TRIPS Agreement marks 
the so far highest standard IP demanding countries where able to achieve multilaterally – by 
covering all main IP rights, adding comprehensive obligations on IP enforcement, and 
significantly advancing protections in core areas such as patents and trademarks. However, 
these additions came at a price for IP demanding countries: To secure a consensus on TRIPS, 
they needed to accept some provisions – such as Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS and several other 
flexibilities – that primarily embody the demands of developing and IP-importing countries for 
balancing IP protection with access to protected goods and services.   
 
Ironically, the core of these provisions allow us to identify another revolutionary change: They 
change the nature of international IP rule-making from mere reciprocal protection of other 
contracting parties’ right holders to a system that is built around common objectives and 
principles for IP protection: In Article 7 TRIPS, all WTO Members agreed to a balance between 
the promotion of innovation (via IP protection) and the transfer and dissemination of technology 
(via limits to protection). In Article 8, they agree that TRIPS allows Members to take measures 
necessary to protect public interests vital for their development. These collective goals set out 
a rather loose frame within which WTO Members can implement their TRIPS obligations in 
light of their domestic needs. More importantly, the ‘constitutionalization’ of a common 
objective in TRIPS affects the ability of WTO Members to further change the international IP 
system in a post-TRIPS world: If taken serious, these constitutional elements of the multilateral 
system serve as a control so that future amendments do not undermine the common goals 
expressed in Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS. 
 
In essence, this change in the nature of international IP rule-making may be viewed equally 
revolutionary as the shift to the trade forum. As the former is essentially a response to demands 
for the latter, they are interdependent: the global consensus to significantly strengthen the 
international standards for IP protection and enforcement via TRIPS included, as a quid-pro-
quo, accepting Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS as reflecting the positions of those concerned about the 
effect the new global standards would have on access to technology, other IP protected goods 
or services, and on the ability to protect public interests at home.163 This quid-pro-quo included 
to position Articles 7 and 8 as ‘Objectives’ and ‘Principles’ of TRIPS. Their role has 
subsequently confirmed and emphasised by all WTO Members in the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health.164 If one takes the wider international context and the political 
economy of international IP negotiations since the 1970ies into account, the shift to the trade 
forum and the codification of common goals of IP protection represent two sides of the same 
coin: They reflect the continuous struggle between IP-exporting and IP-importing countries 
about the design of an international framework. Each side represents important forces that are 
																																																						
162 See Grosse Ruse-Khan, 2016, 324-29; Roffe & Vea, 2009, 79 and generally Patel et al, 2001. 
163 See the review of the negotiation history of Articles 7 and 8 in Section 3.1.1. 
164 See section 3.2. 
still driving the system. This adds a political dimension to the legal arguments for taking both 
sides serious.  
 
Looking at the relationships between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus FTAs in light of the collective 
goals expressed in Article 7 and the public interest principles of Article 8, we find a complex 
and sophisticated system at work. The integral nature of the common goals established in 
TRIPS’ object and purpose creates a form of ‘resilience’165 of the multilateral system over 
attempts for inter-se modifications: The multilateral IP system under TRIPS is robust as it does 
not allow derogating from provisions essential for WTO Members to implement a balance 
between IP protection and access which Article 7 establishes. As this balance is rather loosely 
framed in TRIPS, it leaves a lot of room for WTO Members to fine-tune it on the domestic level 
– or even to modify it via an FTA with other WTO Members. The same goes for the ability to 
take measures to protect public interests in line with Article 8 – which needs to remain on the 
table as an option for WTO Members. Again, a lot depends on what Members consider suitable 
in their domestic context. Hence only grave interferences with the ability to balance and to 
protect core public interests can be captured under the prohibition to derogate from the common 
goals set out in Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS. These limits to inter-se modifications nevertheless 
constitute a true multilateral framework – not simply a set of minimum standards which can be 
expanded at will. In that regard, TRIPS may be considered as a loose constitutional order on 
the international IP plane – one that allows WTO Members a right to regulate and to determine 
the most suitable IP balance for its domestic circumstances.  
																																																						
165 I borrow this instructive term from the subtitle of Dinwoodie’s and Dreyfuss’ book: A Neofederalist Vision of 
TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, 2012. The term here however is 
understood as toughness, ability to resist or capacity to withstand difficulties – instead of elasticity or flexibility 
(as Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss primarily appear to understand resilience). 
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